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COMBAT FORCES

Infantry Journal • Field Artillery Journal

DEFENSE IN DEPTH

Quotes from "A Soldier's Story"

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

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UNITED STATES ARMY

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Infantry Journal, 1904-1950 • *Field Artillery Journal, 1910-1950*

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Vol. 1, No. 12 — **July 1951**

COVER: H-19 Flying Ambulance evacuates wounded from the front lines in Korea *(Wide World photo.)*

TO THE EDITORS 4

YOU AND YOUR ARMY. Comment for the Combat Forces 9

DEFENSE IN DEPTH. *Lieutenant Colonel John E. Kelly* 13

BATTLE FACTS FOR YOUR OUTFIT:
Lean and Hungry Soldiers. *Colonel John T. Corley* 16

WHAT HELICOPTERS CAN DO FOR US.
Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Matheny, Jr. 19

THE CRITICS OF THE ARMY. *Colonel S. L. A. Marshall* 22

REPORT FROM KOREA
What's Right and Wrong with Close Air Support.
Major Michael J. Dolan 24

GI's GENERAL 31

SOLVING THE 6400-mil NEMESIS.
Lieutenant Edward T. Klett, Jr. 34

NEW ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER 35

SOVIET COMMAND AND STAFF METHODS.
Lieutenant Colonel J. D. Hittle 36

MOS: BRIEFING OFFICER. *Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Wright, Jr., and Major Lauren E. McBride* 41

CEREBRATIONS 42

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY SURVEY
World Perimeters. *Colonel Conrad H. Lanza* 44

NEWS OF THE SERVICES 46

BOOK REVIEWS 48

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Stubb's Opposite

To the Editors:

Lieutenant Stubb—the fighting man in combat, the slum in garrison—has an opposite. And he is my problem. He is the suave, sharp, well-trained noncom in garrison, but the clutched-up, scared, weakling under shot and shell. He is the one who may really bring trouble when trouble is most expensive. And he is the one who is given to me to lead my gutty Private Stubb.

LIEUTENANT ————————
Korea

Back in the Mud

To the Editors:

Your comment in the May issue—"Out of the Mud"—was splendid, up to a point. But I think you have got a state of living—perhaps existing is a better word—confused with a state of mind.

First, suppose we dispose of Ernie Pyle and Bill Mauldin. They did a splendid job: each told the truth as he saw it; each brought the infantryman deserved honor by showing the American people a man doing a dangerous, dirty job—doing it competently, sometimes gallantly.

And that, gentlemen, is the only way Pyle or Mauldin or anyone else could have brought the Infantry understanding and appreciation. If I have learned nothing else in the last five years, I have learned that it is impossible for a soldier to explain to someone who has not been a soldier what an infantryman does, on a professional basis. This is not said in derogation of civilians, but in deference to the fact that ground combat is inexplicable in terms of reality to anyone who has not in some degree experienced it. The Air Force, for instance, do something a man can sink his teeth into; they drop bombs on people. It is not nearly so descriptive or satisfying to say that the infantryman shoots people, but if we venture much farther afield, we end up lecturing on small unit tactics to a bewildered audience.

Now, what about the infantryman, himself? He is a man with remarkably few illusions, and I cannot believe that he is going to be very impressed by being told that he is a BAR man because he is a superior soldier qualified by exhaustive tests to carry a BAR. He knows too well —and he should know—that the end product of his training may, if he stays whole, be months on end of alternate boredom and desperate battle under conditions ranging from uncomfortable to unbearable. To be sure, he will have moments of high courage, even of high comedy, to remember, but I for one—though I am as proud of my infantry service as any man—can remember none that I could not have lived without through a long and peaceful life.

Let us not try to make of the infantryman a super technician, even though it is honest to say that he is. Nothing is going to change the conditions under which he must fight, the dragging fatigue he must bear. No skill, no physical or mental qualifications are proof against these things, or against the fear that he will either learn to live with or give way to.

He will fight because he must, or because he is too damned proud to run, or because he respects the men beside him, or because the will to survive is strong or because he is one of an outfit that has fought gallantly in the great tradition of infantry. Who knows what part of all these things motivates him as an individual?

I would not be concerned about the infantryman's skills, his intelligence, or his physical endurance. If he is well led, and intelligently trained for battle, he will be all right and his outfit will be all right; you'll not make it any better by telling him he has been tapped for this great honor by an IBM machine.

In battle, he becomes the inheritor of a tradition older than the legions of Rome. He, above all others, can claim the title "soldier" in its purest sense—"skilled warrior"—and his pride in the second rather than the first word of that definition is as fierce as it is inarticulate.

But, the only way you can make a man proud to be an infantryman is to make him one, and though it is ironic that you have to catch him first, I would be worried if the order of things were otherwise.

EX-442D COMBAT TEAM

Must Reading

To the Editors:

Thanks for the reminder that my subscription will soon expire. COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is a must on the reading list of all of us on active service and I hereby renew for two years. You'll find my check enclosed.

I enjoy the new magazine. I had some hesitancy about the merger, thinking that the *Infantry Journal* was tops. But, the same top quality infantry material is there, plus the big bonus batch of news of the supporting arms. I thoroughly enjoy it.

Lieutenant Art Kuhlman's "Always Another Mountain," in the April issue was a good example of the type of small unit action articles that most of the company grade officers and men like. Professional writers may paint prettier word pictures of isolated actions, but it takes the man who was there when it happened, and stayed around after it was over, to speak the language of the line company soldier.

CAPT. JOHN B. KILGORE, JR.
1204 S.W. 30
Oklahoma City, Okla.

Renewal

To the Editors:

Enclosed is my check extending my membership. I am sorry I let it hang for so long, as I had no intention of cancelling my membership.

I am still reading copies of the *Infantry Journal* which were saved for me while I was on Bataan and in Jap prison camps.

LT. COL. ALBERT C. WOLFE
Route 1
Antioch, Ill.

General Patton

To the Editors:

The article on General Patton was interesting but appeared to contain a slight prejudice. I thought it was significant that the author believed General Patton allowed his picture to be taken by his men so that they might be looked at years later and General Patton would again relive his days of glory.

General Patton will never have to have his memory honored by such tenuous means. He will be remembered by Americans as long as his statue, sculptured by Mr. James E. Fraser, and erected at the United States Military Academy, stands.

General Patton was a superb battle commander. Like all of us he had his human weaknesses; but unlike most of us, he possessed the spark of military leadership that gave him command of an army.

LT. COL. STEWART L. MCKENNEY
U.S. Military Academy
West Point, N.Y.

All Able Officers

To the Editors:

The letter in the March, 1951 issue signed by "Major Disillusionment" makes me boil. He complains about Army promotion policies. My comment is not concerned with his absurd beef that Regular officers are not being promoted as fast as Reserve officers. I am concerned with this old song and dance about "those who were considered *able* enough to hold Regular commissions." I have heard this general theme before—in the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL and its predecessors, and elsewhere.

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Certainly the Army would not officially agree that Regular officers are more able than Reserve officers. During nine years of continuous active duty as a Reserve officer I have seen no proof that would prove such a contention.

As I see it, all officers are good, bad or indifferent, irrespective of their component. But sad to say, there are a few Regulars who hold themselves superior to all Reserve officers.

CAPT. FRANK W. CONNOR, JR.
3715 East 77th St.
Seattle 5, Wash.

• And *vice versa*?—EDITORS.

Student Deferment

To the Editors:

I recently attended a dry run on mobilization planning for all key personnel of all units of the reserve 84th Airborne Division. Some poop was passed down the line that college professors and high school principals were advising students not to join the Army. Something ought to be done about that.

All of this hullabaloo that is raised in the press about UMT, the drafting of men into the Army, the business of educating high school and college students gives me a terrific headache. So in good old Army talk I say "nuts" to civilians.

We must get men in the service and I feel sure that once there most of them will like it. All it takes is good leadership and common sense to convert many of the men who think otherwise.

I had my share of gripes and bitches while in the Army but I still like the Army because some of the greatest days of my life were spent in its uniform.

SGT. BERNARD F. GORDON
2318 W. Rice St.
Chicago 22, Ill.

Jobs for Reservists

To the Editors:

I wrote you once before and you published my letter. I am writing this because I have something to say and your magazine is the best place I know to have it get some attention.

I dropped into the armory with my husband, who is a sergeant instructor, and while waiting for him to finish up some of his work listened to two enlisted men, both of whom are seniors at a local college. One was complaining to my husband that because he was of draft age, twenty-one years old, and also because he was a member of the National Guard, he was having trouble finding a job and had been told by one prospective employer that "he would like very much to hire me but as I was twenty-one and an active member of the National Guard, he couldn't take a chance." The man then said that he supposed he could get some work — possibly digging ditches — but whatever it was he was pretty sure he wouldn't be using his college education.

We live in a manufacturing town and it has come to my attention that most of the firms here turn thumbs down on draft-age employees. I know this, because I am a member of the Reserve Corps (ex-Wac) and have heard the men in the unit I am attached to, discuss this disgraceful situation.

Now I would like to know if you and your readers don't agree that these firms would be the first to scream for protection, should there be any sort of trouble around their plant. And they would scream for the National Guard. Also, if war came—and for my money there is one on right now—these are the firms who will pile up government orders and make money hand over fist. And yet they are unwilling to hire young men who are perfectly capable of making a living, because they may have to go into the service.

It seems to me that the firms with government orders are the worst offenders.

Don't you think it is about time that someone got after these firms and made them hire young men who have enough patriotism and respect for their country to join a reserve or National Guard out fit?

LOUISE LOCKWOOD

Military Honor

To the Editors:

Tell Colonel Greybeard that my own experience is in line with his, and that I am in complete agreement with him as to the value of restoring military honor. What he didn't mention was why this deterioration of standards came about. I first noted it after passage of the Promotion Bill of 1920, which provided that promotion would be based on efficiency reports, instead of professional examinations. In my long service I could see the change this law brought about—lack of desire for professional efficiency, and a strong desire to cultivate the favor of superiors. Prior to this law officers obeyed orders absolutely, but they did not hesitate to criticize a commander at the club, and sometimes directly to him, when they disagreed with the order. Nothing like that after the basing of promotion on reports by commanders.

COL. CONRAD H. LANZA
1911 Elm street
Manchester, N.H.

Battalion Names

To the Editors:

Morale is vital to the effective operation of any unit, to be sure. But silver embroidery soon tarnishes, and money is soon spent. Something far more lasting is needed.

The best suggestion that I have read was in *Armor* magazine. There, Colonel Charles Raymond suggested that our battalions be named. He made such suggestions as "Yosemite Rangers," "Rocky

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It is hard to have personal pride in numbers and letters. But a Vermont recruit, for instance, would be proud to be a member of the "Ethan Allen's Rangers" or the "Green Mountain Rifles."

RICHARD H. POE

77 South Street
Stamford, Conn.

Americal Division

To the Editors:

I am quite proud of my old outfit, the Americal Division, and I am put out that you printed its insignia in red on the back cover of the June issue. The Americal patch has a blue background with white stars and not a bloody background.

Along with that gripe I want to congratulate Colonel Marshall on his very fine "Bayonet Charge." The men of Easy Company deserve any award they may receive.

SERGEANT DANIEL G. MERLIN, JR.
Det 1, 1122d ASU
Boston 10, Mass.

AUS Gripes

To the Editors:

In my opinion, these policies are definitely affecting AUS officers:

The Adjusted Date-of-Rank Policy: It seems to favor the Regulars. But it discriminates against Regulars who were AUS in the last war, got out, and later accepted a Regular commission. And it definitely discriminates against Reserve and National Guard officers on extended active duty. I believe it should discriminate, but only to the extent that it would permit promotion of Regular officers of the same general military experience and grade before AUS officers. As now applied, Regular officers whose experience in present grade was in peacetime are automatically promoted while promotions are denied AUS officers returned to EAD whose experience in present grade was wartime. It also permits advancement of younger Regulars over older AUS officers. Do efficiency reports or actual duty assignments support this? Do Regulars of same grade get better efficiency reports and more demanding duty assignments than AUS officers? I know the answers in particular cases, but, to be fair, the Army-wide answers should be made known.

And why do I call it discrimination? Being an engineer, and having taken active part in both ORC and National Guard training during the time I was not on active duty, I may be a special case. Maybe my civilian experience is of value militarily, and maybe the civilian experience of a combat arms officer is not, and therefore, perhaps the general policy must continue to regard all civilian experience as of no value. This may be valid up to a limited point. But the point has already been passed. I believe promotion should be based on relative merit and not solely on time spent on active duty.

Civilian Components Promotion: There is supposed to be such a thing, but all attempts are disapproved because there are no vacancies. You must get AUS promotion if you're on duty, or none. But civilian components officers not on duty can be promoted in civilian components.

Pay: The pay of the services is low by the standards of the country. Comparison with so-called low-paid Civil Service will easily prove this.

Subsistence: This, rather than pay, should be adjustable to the cost-of-living index.

Uniform Allowance: There is a great discrimination against AUS officers on a short tour of service (if they are short). An officer must purchase a uniform which can't return its full value.

Term of Service: There are many factors involved here and no AUS officer can possibly predict his term of service. You may say the same was true during the war, but then we could look forward to victory for the termination of our service. Until an objective is defined, no effective policy stating when AUS officers will be released is possible.

CAPT. T. SHERBURNE SMITH
Redstone Arsenal
Huntsville, Ala.

UNITED STATES ARMY
COMBAT FORCES
JOURNAL

YOU AND YOUR ARMY

Michaelis on Air Power

WHEN Brigadier General John H. Michaelis, the famed former boss of the prowling Wolfhounds of the 27th Infantry Regiment, was in Washington some weeks ago, he was interviewed on the use of air power in close support of infantry by *Air Force,* the magazine of the Air Force Association. What the young infantry general had to say constitutes important evidence on a subject that merits continuing discussion and thought.

In answer to a question as to whether the Wolfhounds had received enough close air support, General Michaelis answered:

"We couldn't have had much more close support. In fact, we got spoiled. There was a tendency on the part of ground commanders to ask for air support when artillery and mortars could have done the job. That was the only thing I disliked about calling for a strike. Our artillery and mortars had to cease firing. But we had all the air support we could handle. I've had as many as twenty-seven flights stacked up over my area, waiting for their turn. We'd have to ask the piston jobs to wait awhile so the jets could drop their loads."

The lack of range of jet aircraft was a handicap when the air was based in Japan, he said. Also, it is harder to identify targets from a speeding jet than from a piston job. "But that is ironed out with experience," he said. Jets seemed to take battle damage better than piston-driven planes but the latter were better for strafing since they can put more bullets into a given area.

Napalm is unquestionably the best weapon of air power from the point of view of the infantryman, he said. But it isn't accurate, and the Air Force gets only about one hit out of eight tries. Fragmentation bombs are good and so are rockets against tanks. But naplam is better.

General Michaelis said he would go along with the Air Force interpretation of their interdiction mission. "It makes a lot of sense to knock out a truck or locomotive fifty miles behind the lines instead of waiting until it's delivered its load." He said the Wolfhounds saw plenty of evidence of the value of interdiction when they advanced out of the Pusan beachhead. "Trucks, ammunition and fuel, bridges, railroads. And a lot of dead Commies."

He recalled an incident in the "Bowling Alley" near Taegu where air power had saved the day. "We had been enflanked by a Commie regiment. It was a pretty tight spot. Our forward air controller picked up a flight of seven B-26s which had been unable to hit its primary target. He asked for a strike. They were low on gas and screamed bloody murder but they made one pass for us and dropped 4,400 pounds of bombs within 400 yards of my CP."

Air support wasn't considered close "unless the empty caliber .50 shells from the strafing planes were bouncing off our helmets. That's a fact. Our forward air controller would adjust a strike just like an observer adjusts artillery. They'd make a pass, he'd call it, over or short, and they'd try it again. Sometimes when the Commies were too close for comfort we'd mark our positions with panels, withdraw to a safe distance, and call on the air to beat them up. We even called for air strikes within our own lines. Back in July the air knocked out three enemy tanks that had penetrated our perimeter."

The only time the air let them down was in unflyable weather. "That's the main problem. The doughfoots moan and groan when the weather socks in. Then, and at night, are the only times the Chinese move. And the night problem has been eased by flare-dropping C-47s."

The Marines had an edge on the Air Force in the early days because "their pilots had ground training and knew what a mortar position, for example, looked like from the air." An Air Force pilot learned fast and got just as wise "after a couple of tours of duty as a forward air controller, eating the same dirt as the infantryman and sleeping in the same hole."

Should the Army have its own organic planes to handle close air support?

"It would be nice. I would have liked to have had the 27th Fighter Group, which was doing such a good job for us, permanently at my disposal for air support. But organic air is a luxury the U. S. Army can't afford. You lose too much in flexibility for what you stand to gain."

ROTC Medals

IN the April issue, we briefly mentioned the medals which the Association was awarding to outstanding cadets in senior Infantry and Artillery ROTC units. The Artillery award was a continuation of the tradition established by the Field Artillery in 1936. The Infantry medal was new this year.

Ninety-one Infantry ROTC Medal Awards and thirty-two Artillery medals have been awarded this year. In almost every case, the awards were made at appropriate ceremonies or reviews and received attention in local newspapers. But even more important to us has been the reaction of the PMS&Ts and the Cadets themselves to these awards. Their letters to us are brimful of enthusiasm for the awards and the implied honor.

We congratulate each winning cadet and in the next issue we expect to report the name of all the winners of the medals.

JCS Unshaken

WHEN the history of recent events in Washington is written it may be recorded that General MacArthur was his own worst witness; but it won't be wholly true. That it appears so may have been because of the persuasive, highly pertinent testimony of Generals Marshall and Bradley. Where General MacArthur cultivated or permitted the cultivation of the aura of mystery and grandeur that had so long enshrouded his figure by dramatically flying back and forth from the Waldorf-Astoria in New York to the Senate Office Building, the two Pentagon generals made no more of their appearance on Capitol Hill than if they had been appearing there to justify a routine appropriation for the Department of Defense.

But when they were on the witness stand, their testimony, as read in the record, was much more complete and logical than General MacArthur's. They presented facts persuasively, explained in endless detail the unfolding of events in Korea since last June, and described the actions they had taken on those events.

In thus masterfully controlling the situation, Secretary Marshall and General Bradley won a notable victory for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was General Bradley's patient, detailed and reiterated explanation of how the Joint Chiefs arrive at their decisions, how they are independent of even the influence of the Secretary of Defense when a military question is at stake, of how close and intimate is the relationship of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to the President—all of this made the Joint Chiefs of Staff a stronger instrument and one less likely to be attacked within or without the services in the future.

Two restrictions that hedged the testimony of the two generals were obvious. They had to maintain their positions as confidential advisers to the President. This, as Senator Russell observed, is similar to the confidential relationship between a doctor and patient or a lawyer and client. If that confidential position could be breached through senatorial questions, the value of the Chairman of the JCS to the President would disappear, General Bradley observed. It was not breached.

The other recognized restriction was the value to the Soviet Union of the information that was being laid bare in the record. This worried

Secretary Marshall a great deal and he often commented upon it. "I have felt through a good deal of this as though I were sort of acting as an intelligence agent for the Soviet Government and the Chinese Communist Government —but they don't provide one for me," he said at one point.

But there was a third restriction on the Generals, one generally unrecognized because it was an intra-service matter. It has been American policy for many decades to give a theater commander a general directive and forces large enough to attain his mission, and then let him run his operations in his own way, subject to general supervision, including, of course, adherence to the overall political aims of the government. This policy had been unquestioned until General MacArthur's removal. The only theater commander relieved during the second world war was General Stilwell—at the insistence of Chiang Kai-shek and not because of differences between Vinegar Joe and the JCS or the Administration.

In their testimony Secretary Marshall and General Bradley not only had to justify their military reasons for recommending the removal of General MacArthur, but they had the more difficult problem of explaining it to the senators in such a way as not to disturb the future of the policy of full authority and responsibility for theater commanders. Every theater commander—Eisenhower in Paris, Handy in Germany, Matt Ridgway in Tokyo, and all the other theater commanders—and every other officer who consciously or unconsciously realized that some day he might have high command—was watching the testimony.

The Pentagon had to be circumspect in destroying MacArthur's arguments. His distortions, evasions and unfairness had to be pointed out by indirection. Any suggestion that MacArthur's tactics or strategy had been wrong—and here the problem of the dispositions of the Eighth Army and Tenth Corps on the eve of the Chinese Communist intervention was critical—had to be explained carefully and fully.

Note how General Bradley did it:

SENATOR FULBRIGHT— . . . Do you agree with that—that his troops were deployed in the best possible way under the existing conditions?

GENERAL BRADLEY—Well, Senator, we were a little bit worried, looking at the map from here, as to those dispositions and we asked General MacArthur if he needed any additional or changed directives and he said he did not. We did not send him many messages as to our worries about the disposition because you cannot fight a battle and conduct a battle from 7,000 miles away, which we were. You must let your field commander fight that battle. . . . it would be quite improper to try to tell him from here how exactly to dispose of his divisions, and so we did not do so.

SENATOR FULBRIGHT— . . . The developments, what actually happened, did that confirm his estimate of the situation or not?

GENERAL BRADLEY—No, I doubt if you could say it did, because later we were able to join the two corps and form a continuous line which extended across the peninsula.

* * *

SENATOR FULBRIGHT—Well, is it fair to say then that on that point there was disagreement at the highest level on the military situation there? Is that right, there was disagreement?

GENERAL BRADLEY — Well, I don't know whether you would call it disagreement or not. It was a difference of opinion.

SENATOR FULBRIGHT—All right, difference of opinion.

GENERAL BRADLEY — But we refrained from trying to tell him how to do it from here.

In each instance Secretary Marshall and General Bradley were careful to make clear the higher responsibility of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the world-wide security of the United States. They understood, they said, the feelings of a theater commander and they expected a theater commander to be insistent in advocating the interests of his command. But the Joint Chiefs had a higher responsibility.

"While a field commander very properly estimates his needs from the viewpoint of operations in his own theater or sphere of action," General Bradley said, "those responsible for higher direction must necessarily base their actions on broader aspects, and on the needs, actual or prospective, of several theaters.

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in view of their global responsibilities and the perspective with respect to the world-wide strategic situation, are in a better position than is any single theater commander to assess the risk of general war. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are best able to judge our own military resources with which to meet that risk."

On the day after General Bradley had finished his testimony, it was said in the Pentagon that he and General Marshall had accomplished their mission and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had proved its case against General MacArthur without disturbing the future relations of other commanders. If that is so—and it appears to be — it is a notable achievement and one that will enhance the JCS as an institution, making it a stronger force and cementing its place in the government's high-level, policy-making hierarchy.

MP Customs Unit

AT Schirnding, Germany, where the railroad crosses from the U.S. Zone into Czechoslovakia, alert American military policemen spotted flatcars loaded with U.S. Army trucks consigned to a Budapest firm. Check-

ing export licenses and waybills the MPs found that the vehicles were listed as "spare parts" from Army surplus turned over to the German state sales agency for disposal. Examination revealed that each of the trucks was fully equipped and in operating condition. The military policemen called their headquarters in Frankfurt and the information was relayed to the High Commissioner's East-West Trade Group which has its offices in the same building. The Trade Group, whose task is explained by its name, ordered the trucks returned to the shipper.

This was another victory for the 7751st Military Police Customs Unit, a most unusual military organization which is performing an essential job of great significance in the struggle against militant communism.

The 7751st was created in 1949 to bolster West German customs control in its effort to wipe out smuggling and black marketing. The unit established posts at twenty-four highway, rail, air and water points authorized as entry-exit points for Allied personnel. It also patrolled the international borders to check up on German customs officials. More recently High Commissioner John J. McCloy asked that its activities be extended to checking traffic moving across the border betwen the U.S. and Soviet zones of Germany.

The 7751st is a small but prideful outfit of 156 men and 12 officers. Its uniform and equipment are gleaming white and its members wear a special "CU" (Customs Unit) brassard.

In smashing smuggling rings, the unit has had the assistance of a criminal investigation unit formed in EUCOM at the same time the 7751st was organized. These two units worked with German customs agents to break up smuggling and black-market rings that were fleecing West Germany of millions of dollars. One estimate has it that border-running amounted to a $500,000,000 annual business before the unit was formed.

At one highway crossing point a 7751st policeman, in a spirit of helpfulness, raised the hood of an overheated automobile motor to see if he could locate the trouble—and found forty cartons of cigarettes stuffed between the grill and radiator.

At Waidhaus, a gateway to Czechoslovakia, MPs of the customs unit checked on a shipment of machine tools destined for Prague and found the shipping cases contained military aircraft parts, stolen from a RAF warehouse in England. At the same station a shipment of books was discovered to consist of Army training manuals, regulations and other directives. The operation was the real McCoy and not the effort of an exasperated paper shuffler to get rid of his poop once and for all.

It was known that gold was being illegally smuggled into the U.S. Zone. The customs unit cracked the case when it discovered that the gold was arriving in cans disguised as meat. They also broke up the black market operations of occupation personnel who were using the Army Post Office to import large quantities of coffee, fats, cocoa and similar critical items.

The MPs have no authority over anyone except occupation personnel (military and civilian, including foreigners employed by the occupation) but they work closely with German customs agents.

The new mission of checking up on shipments going into Iron Curtain countries is assuming more importance as the war in Korea continues. It is a difficult task for the shipments are usually accompanied by export licenses and waybills seemingly in good order. The trick is to spot shipments that don't jibe with the descriptions in the documents. That's what the alert MPs at Schirnding did when they saw the trainload of former army trucks. Sometimes they spot

shipments they think should be held up but are over-ruled for good reason. For example, a 180-ton turret lathe was stopped at a check point on the Czechslovakia border. It had been shipped from Belgium and the authorities had to permit it to continue because the lathe was licensed for export in accordance with an existing Czech-Belgian trade agreement.

Recently the 7751st celebrated its second birthday, an occasion made memorable by a letter its commanding officer, Colonel George B. Buell, received from Major General John L. McKee, European Command provost marshal. "Your work has been of extreme importance in forestalling the attempts of unscrupulous persons to arm slave nations," General McKee told the 7751st, adding that the "initiative" of the outfit "is a matter of deep pride to all members of the Military Police Corps."

Beer and Ice Cream

WE FEEL impelled to answer that Marine Corps brigadier general who said that soldiers should learn to drink beer and cut out ice cream, or words to that effect. We learned to drink beer in the Army and we'll wager a case of lager that the per capita consumption of beer in the Army is every bit as large or larger than it is in the Marine Corps.

As to ice cream we'll leave it to General Bradley to put the Marine in his place. At one place in his book, *A Soldier's Story*, General Bradley tells how he reported for duty at the Pentagon and then went out for a dish of ice cream. Reporting at the Pentagon is something that even general officers approach with some trepidation and a dish of ice cream will certainly help a man snap back after the ordeal. We recommend it to the Marine BG.

Again, going into Sicily as commander of II Corps, General Bradley tells how he went aboard his ship and met Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk, naval commander of the attack force. "Now General," the Admiral said, "is there anything we can get you? You're our guest while you're aboard."

"Anything?" General Bradley asked him grinning.

"Anything," Admiral Kirk replied.

Then, writes General Bradley in his book, "I ordered a dish of ice cream."

P.S. The II Corps blitzed Sicily in thirty-eight days.

Conveyor System

THANKS to Colonel Richard D. Meyer, TC, who commands the Transportation Corps' Research and Development Station at Fort Eustis, Virginia, we have been made privy to some facts about conveyor systems that we didn't know about when, in our May issue, we made a few light comments on the Transportation Corps' study of the possibility of using automatic conveyors to deliver supplies from ports and railheads to fighting armies. The information Colonel Meyer passed on to us suggests that under certain conditions it may be possible for a modern conveyor system to do a remarkable job with fewer men and at smaller cost than truck or rail transportation.

The best source of information Colonel Meyer furnished us was an article by Mr. Harold Von Thaden, the vice president and general manager of the Robins Engineers Division of Hewitt-Robins, Inc., of New York.

Mr. Von Thaden, who seems to be a fast mover in the conveyor world, says that a 30-inch flat-belt conveyor covering a distance of thirty miles between a port and fourth echelon base could carry five tons of supply every minute. An Army truck carrying five tons would have to load up every minute to keep up with that rate of delivery, he says. That means, Mr. Von Thaden continues "four hundred trucks [would] be needed to do the job of one 30-inch belt conveyor." To keep those four hundred trucks in operation twenty-four hours a day, three drivers would be required for each truck. That makes 1,200 drivers and doesn't include the men required to load and unload the trucks. Mr. Von Thaden says that five times as many men are required to load and unload trucks as to maintain a conveyor system. The 30-mile conveyor system he described could, he says, be manned by a hundred soldier-technicians.

If Mr. Von Thaden is right in his figures he makes what seems to be a pertinent point when he says that it is easier and cheaper to establish an overland belt conveyor over a rice paddy or oxcart trail than it is to build a road that can withstand heavy truck traffic. He says that ninety per cent of Army supplies break down into boxes weighing up to 150 pounds. All of these can be handled, he says, on a 30-inch conveyor.

This is the way he describes the installation of such a belt:

"A quarter of mile of belt conveyor can be laid in two hours by a team of thirty-five men. Substantial . . . previous technical training [is] not necessary as all parts and units [are] standardized in much the same manner as the famous Bailey Bridge. The weight of intermediate sections of such a conveyor is light enough for two men to handle and assemble. The largest components, including the belt itself, are small enough to be carried on a single vehicle. This vehicle would also furnish the power for the driver of the conveyor and act as a base for emergency repairs. Depending upon the terrain, these mobile units, each with a tandem drive, would be spaced every 1,500 or 2,000 feet and take their power from a gasoline engine. Specially designed chutes would facilitate the transfer of cargo from one flight to the next. As the action moved, the conveyor system could be readily taken down and reassembled in a new location."

Mr. Von Thaden says that field maintenance of such a conveyor would take far fewer men than are required to maintain the number of trucks needed to haul the same tonnage.

He says that a "conveyor might be expected to run at a rate of five miles per hour steadily, night and day, without stoppages. The best convoy speed averaged over the famous Red Ball Highway in Europe during the World War II, he says, was thirty miles an hour.

In summing up the advantages of a conveyor system, Mr. Von Thaden says: "Conveyors are easier to install than roads, simpler to operate, are faster and can carry greater loads." Noting that some estimates have it that seven men are required to maintain one man at the front, he says that "With conveyors working in every place possible . . . I believe we could cut that ratio down to five men in the rear areas to one at the front."

He sees other uses for conveyors. Artillery, for example, could well use conveyors "to bring ammunition from receiving points to outlying units." This, he says, would eliminate the need for stockpiling great

(*Continued on page* 43)

DEFENSE *in Depth*

Lieutenant Colonel John E. Kelly

The attacking power of superior numbers of troops can be overcome by deep and mobile defenses that act as a sponge that contains instead of a spring that recoils

LAND warfare always has been a continuous contest between the attack and the defense. Where the attack has been overpowering and the defense unable to cope with it, wars and battles have been short, savage and decisive. But when the defense has been more than capable of repelling the attack, wars have become drawn out stalemates, lasting in some cases for many years. In recent history the struggle has continued. During World War I the defense held the upper hand but in World War II new weapons and techniques gave to the attack the necessary strength to overpower the defense. Defensive battlefield organizations were based on World War I experiences and generally were unable to repel the concentrated power of modern weapons of attack. Moreover, we are still planning our battlefield defenses to repel archaic and outmoded attacks and unless we orient our thought and teachings to give greater depth to our defensive positions in battle, attacking forces will continue to retain their superiority, and our ground armies will be unable to withstand enemy offensives.

The balance of power between the attack and defense has shifted from time to time, and during the wars of the 19th Century it became increasingly evident that the shallow defensive lines of that era had to be changed into deeper sectors or zones. It remained for the French to perfect a new defense in depth and with the advent of the first World War other armies successfully adopted it. With this change in the technique of the conduct of the defense and the perfection of the machine gun, trench mortar, and the improvement of communications for the control of artillery fire, the defense was able to repel the attack. This led to four years of trench warfare and a stalemate along the Western Front.

It is a strange commentary on war that the two new attack weapons which were to greatly influence the conduct of the second World War—the airplane and the tank—were introduced during these battles. Had these weapons been fully developed and exploited they would undoubtedly have swung the tide of battle in favor of the attack. But they were not, and defense remained the master of the battlefield until the end of the war, when the Germans capitulated more be-



LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN E. KELLY, Infantry, is on duty at Headquarters, European Command. He is a graduate of the Military Academy, class of 1936.

cause of economic and political failure than battlefield incompetence.

In World War II, however, despite the reliance that both the French and the Germans placed in their Maginot and Siegfried Lines, at the outset of the conflict, and despite the considered opinion of military experts that this war would follow the pattern of the first World War, the attack, having gained power in the years between 1918 and 1939, asserted its domination of the battlefield. During the first year—after the German conquest of Poland—it appeared that the Maginot Line and the "Little Maginot Line" in Belgium to the North Sea, although untested at that time by an attack in strength, would be able to withstand any type of assault thrown against it. Bred in the trenches of World War I and nurtured by pacifistic ideals which let the West to Munich, reliance was placed in the defense. Stalemate and "phony war" were the order of the day. The Allied ostrich had its head in the sand and hoped that the war would continue in its quiet peaceful fashion.

But the quiet was shattered when the Germans launched their blitzkrieg. Allied defenses collapsed. The Maginot Line was outflanked, and the strong supplementary defensive positions in the north could not withstand the offensive might of the Germans. The German panzer and infantry divisions plunged deep into France and, after the initial breakthrough, encountered only light resistance. Allied defenses crumbled and disintegrated under punishing thrusts, and it was only the English Channel that kept Hitler's soldiery from driving into London itself. Similarly, in 1944, when the Allies decided to attack after building up the prerequisite strength to break out of the Normandy bridgehead, the German Army was unable to stand against the power which the Americans and British brought to bear in western France. This ability of the attack to concentrate and mass in sufficient quantities to break through any defensive position was proved in the Allied drives across Europe, the German drives into Russia, and the Russian counter-offensives to the west. Thus, World War II differed from its predecessor as attack does from the defense. Far from becoming a stalemate, the last war became a pattern of successful attacks and counterattacks. The defensive stalemate was non-existent over protracted periods of time. The attack had gained the upper hand.

Why was this so? Undoubtedly, the power of the attack had been increased considerably in the period between World Wars I and II. What was this power which gave to the offensive such an overwhelming advantage? Principally it was:

(1) The advanced development of armor and its proper exploitation;

(2) The employment in mass of tactical aircraft both to isolate battlefields and to support attacking ground forces; and

(3) To a lesser degree, but still of primary importance, the employment of aircraft to drop units of fighting men behind the battle lines.

While these advantages were being scored for the attack, the art of defense, on the other hand, progressed little during the years between the two great conflicts. Most thought was given to the development of new means and weapons of attack. Relatively little thought was given to improving the defense. As an example, the machine gun of World War I, the great defensive weapon of the era, was used in World War II unchanged. Moreover, such improvements as the infantry and artillery did make in their armament contributed relatively little to giving the defense assistance in its struggle with the attack, until the VT fuze was perfected. Undoubtedly, this fuze will influence the conduct of both the attack and defense and may even change the shape of future battles, but in World War II, except in isolated instances, it came too late to influence the course of the war, and the attack remained master of the battlefield.

DESPITE the new means of assault, little change was made in defensive tactics. The evolution in defense before 1914 died in the stalemate of World War I. During that conflict the strength of the defensive was enhanced not only by technical achievements, such as the machine gun and combat communications, but also by improving the tactical organization of battlefield defense by deepening the battle zone in front of and behind the main line of resistance. In World War I it was believed that this increased depth in the defensive structure would weaken the enemy as he progressed into the position so that counterattacks launched at the proper place and proper time would prove successful. The depth of positions was based principally upon the terrain, forces available, and of course, the enemy. Fortunately, during this war, the latter possessed certain limiting characteristics. The tank and airplane had not reached maturity, and so the enemy generally attacked on foot, supported by artillery. Bearing in mind these constant factors, the depth of the defense was based to a considerable extent upon the ability of the infantryman to penetrate the main line of resistance. In order to successfully oppose the mass assault of manpower over broad fronts, combat organizations at all echelons of command normally placed the major portion of their strength in the front line and kept a small portion in reserve.

This organization for defense (still employed twenty-five years later) was founded on the need for defeating large bodies of foot soldiers attacking over all types of terrain. It was not, however, prepared to resist the strong concentrations of infantry and armor supported by airborne troops and tactical aircraft. To be sure the Allies, initially on the defensive in Russia and France, finally won the last war, but their ultimate triumph was after their defenses failed. The World War II defensive organization of armies collapsed time and again, except against local attacks, because it did not have the necessary depth to withstand the penetrating characteristics of the new attack.

The offense had gained depth and this gave it a decided advantage over the defense. The ability of armored forces to exploit, break through and drive penetrations deep behind enemy lines was a dominant factor in the success of most offensives. Certainly this ability signally contributed to the rapid fall of France in 1940. Vertical envelopment —the use of airborne troops—per-

mitted commanders to drop relatively large forces behind enemy lines to seize and hold important areas. In some battles this gave the attacker the necessary advantage. How successful would the landings at Normandy have been without the successful employment of the 101st and 82d Airborne Divisions to seize and hold important areas miles to the rear of the beaches? Certainly, the employment of these troops contributed materially to the success of the Normandy invasion. The third important factor which added depth to the attack was the development of the tactical employment of air power to support ground attacks. The ability of friendly air forces to interrupt enemy communications and keep their strategic reserves from influencing the fight was a deciding factor in many battles. Air power also assisted ground forces by assaulting targets which could not properly be taken under fire by artillery or other arms. There were many instances of this support in the last war, and a typical example of the considerable depth which such action gives to the attack was the effective isolation of the battlefield in Normandy and the close support rendered infantry and armor during those battles.

Thus, the advantage which the attack now has over the defense is its ability, through new arms and new techniques, simultaneously to attack front-line positions, rear areas and lines of communications. Our present defensive doctrine, while effective against 1918-style attacks is nothing more than a linear system, not unlike a "cordon" defense, which can be breached wherever and whenever the attacker wishes to mass his forces and assault the line. Present defensive technique does not provide the necessary depth to absorb and defeat the present-day attack.

The organization of our defensive battle position has often been described as a spring. The coil of the defensive spring is gradually pushed back by the force of the attack until it reaches a point where it is strong enough to repel the assaulting units. But to combat and repel the twentieth century attack, we should not have a spring but a sponge, or perhaps, a pool of quicksand. Instead of repelling the attack with a spring-like defense that permits the enemy to prepare itself again for a fresh assault in a new location, we absorb and then annihilate the attacking force. In this day of mechanized penetrations, supported by air power attacking deep behind the front lines, we must reorient ourselves and, instead of placing our reliance on holding front-line strongpoints, we should take advantage of our mobility and dispose of strong reserves in depth that can harass and attack the tenuous points of the enemy penetration, defend critical strategic areas miles to the rear of the main line of resistance, and counterattack in strength at the right place and the proper time.

THE machine gun no longer rules the battlefield. Our defensive organization has been too linear and proportionately too strong in the forward areas. Instead of concentrating the major portion of our strength to defend terrain along a front line, we should defend these forward areas with a minimum of force and retain the major portion in mobile reserve.

This realignment of forces to the rear will carry with it distinct advantages to combat the depth and penetrating characteristics of the attack. With added strength prepared to meet them at critical points in the rear areas, attacking armored columns will be harassed, halted, bled and annihilated. Whereas formerly such columns were free to seize important tactical and strategic centers, cut off lines of communication and defeat whole armies even as Hannibal did at Cannae over 2000 years ago, if new depth be given to the defense such columns would have constant battles of significant proportions which would weaken them for the final blow, of a strong counteroffensive by a large mobile reserve.

The presence of large reserves disposed to the rear and ready to attack in any direction, will greatly strengthen the defense against airborne attacks and partisan thrusts. Most airborne operations, which succeeded in the past war, owed their success in large measure to the fact that the units involved had adequate time to consolidate after landing and move to their objectives before strong reserves could attack them. Partisan forces were rarely successfully employed in forward areas where the presence of combat troops made their operations too costly but, on the other hand, were employed with considerable success along lines of communications where they found supply units without combat force protection. Strong concentrations of combat troops in the rear areas certainly will decrease the effectiveness of these two types of enemy actions.

This concept has been based on the assumption that most modern armies will have strong armored formations and tactical air support. Where this does not pertain, less defensive depth will be required. As always, the situation will dictate the defensive organization required at any given moment, but, whatever the force at the disposal of the defense, against a modern highly mechanized army, defense must be in depth. This concept does not mean that more or less divisions are required to accomplish a defensive task, but that assigned forces should be deployed more in depth. It will be a rare case when the major portion of our combat strength should be assigned to the defense of the forward battle position. When troops are so positioned, the enemy normally can hold them in place with secondary attacks while he mounts his main assault in one sector. Thus when the breakthrough is made, forces already committed to the defense along a broad front, will be of little value in combating the main enemy effort, since they can be extracted for further use in battling the penetration only after considerable delay, if at all.

The armor-infantry-artillery team has demonstrated its power to punch through defensive lines and continue the attack for hundreds of miles. Paratroopers have clearly shown that they can drop behind forward defenses, seize strategic localities, and hold them for days until relieved by reinforcements. Air forces have developed the technique and capacity to strike deep behind the front lines and support offensives by isolating the battlefields and by knocking out strong points of resistance. To combat this, we must give our defense depth, so that our forces can be prepared to absorb and annihilate the inevitable penetrations of the front line rather than attempt to repel mass assaults of infantrymen all along the front line. We must not wait until the next war to re-orient our thinking and realign our defensive teachings to combat modern attacks. Our technique and tactics of defense should be re-examined and re-evaluated now with a view to strengthening reserves at all echelons of command, increasing their mobility, and disposing these forces so that battle positions will be strong enough and deep enough to defeat today's attack.

BATTLE FACTS
FOR YOUR OUTFIT

Lean and Hungry Soldiers

Colonel John T. Corley

OUR Army is not designed for its primary mission of killing the enemy. It is over-equipped and too much imbued with the attitude of "Let George do it." We think we can fight as we live, but you can't fight a peasant nation like Russia on the American standard of living.

We are blessed and handicapped with the highest standard of living in the world, but we can never fight as we live. And to safeguard that standard of living for the Nation, we must readjust our *army* standard of living to that of the enemy we fight. When we don't, we put the American fighting man, overburdened with superior equipment, at a great disadvantage. What good is a piece of equipment if you never use it? What good is it if it doesn't contribute directly or indirectly to the destruction of the enemy?

In his 58th Maxim, Napoleon put it forcefully: "The first quality of the soldier is fortitude in enduring fatigue and privation; valor is only the second. Poverty, privation and misery are the school of the good soldier." Valor is our biggest asset in the American soldier. We must help our troops in every possible way to bring their great courage into play against heavy odds. Softened by our way of living, everburdened with equipment, our fighting men are seriously handicapped.

You cannot take an American fresh out of civilian life and make him a soldier overnight. There has to be a hardening process. Our training divisions are equipped to turn Americans from civilians into fighting men. From there on it is life in the field in an outfit with which he may or may not fight. Rigid discipline and practical training make a soldier.

The attrition rate is bound to be high, but there must be a place where the soldier moves from the normal standard of living to the meager conditions he must exist under when he fights an enemy who lives on a "shoe string"—an enemy who lives on two meals a day and goes into battle with his weapon, some grenades, a sack of food and a bandoleer of ammunition.

COLONEL J. T. CORLEY, Infantry, commands a regiment of infantry in Korea. During World War II he was a battalion commander in the 1st Infantry Division.

The philosophy of the rugged men—soldiers who can endure privation, fatigue and misery—must pervade all echelons

Our fighting men must temporarily give up their comforts. Their reward should be great upon their victorious return. But service in the Army itself should promise only privation, for only by such a system can we safeguard our standard of living.

We should by no means throw away the military progress we have made since 1776. But we should revamp our Army, so we can fight with minimum essential equipment. And this system applies to our combat-support troops as well as our front-line soldiers. Every extra pound of gear and paraphernalia that support troops or headquarters carry, over and above their minimum needs, cuts down the truck, rail, plane or ship space available to support our front-line troops.

The men of our units must travel light and learn to make the country work for them. We are the greatest improvisers in the world. Let's take advantage of this characteristic and allow our soldiers to fill out their meager existence from the country in which they fight. All a soldier needs is his rifle, pack, grenades, belt with canteen, cup, ammunition and first aid kit, poncho, blanket, shovel, socks and rations. Toilet articles should be carried, for a dirty soldier is generally a poor soldier. Other personal effects may be carried in his pockets or in his pack. Our quartermasters should be prepared to set up a change of clothing for the soldier whenever he visits a shower unit. This system of training must start upon induction and follow through with rigid enforcement as the soldier is alerted for overseas movement. A soldier must travel and live as he will fight; he must not be overburdened with extra gear.

Laden with the gear of war Doughs of the 24th Infantry Division plod up a hill to new positions overlooking the Han River.

The army pack is too heavy and too rugged. It is designed to last several enlistments. Why not use a lightweight nylon rucksack without all the carrying straps as on our present pack? The poncho and blanket can be carried in a horseshoe roll like the rolls of soldiers from time immemorial. Soldiers not in contact with the enemy may be authorized a shelter-half roll which could be carried under the arm when moving. Service during World War II and in Korea has shown that a soldier will not carry a bulky pack in combat. He wants to travel light. Why not let him? Present stock of packs could be used by combat support troops. A soldier's belt with his ammunition, canteen, canteen cup and first aid kit and a compass for leaders is a "must." It would be hard to improve on our present belt.

Mess kits are old stuff. All messes should be equipped with the circular compartment plate. We cannot afford the luxury of a tray; it's too heavy and bulky. A soldier should carry his mess kit. In combat, he can use native utensils when he has to eat native food. When he draws 10-in-1 or 5-in-1 rations, the mess plate should be issued to him. Each soldier should carry his mess spoon with him. (Make it a *small* spoon!) The knife and fork should be issued with the mess plate.

American equipment is designed to last years. All we do is over-burden the army surplus stores when the war is over. Why not design the equipment to last a year or so? Seldom does a campaign last longer. The African campaign lasted six months; Sicily, one month; New Guinea, seven months; Philippines, five months, and



The barren hills and valleys of Korea provide no cover for these M-46 tanks encircled in an assembly area.

Okinawa, one month. Even the invasion and the occupation of Europe took less than a year. More equipment is thrown away than worn out.

WHILE we are at it, let's tidy up our tail. Too often, we slow our rate of advance to that of our rear echelon. Our tail must be designed to keep up with and support our head. General Patton's great march across France wasted many gallons of gasoline carrying junk that didn't contribute at all to his march. What good is a barracks bag full of clothes to a soldier fighting for his existence?

Service elements become moving-van outfits. A service company of an infantry regiment should stick to *service* and never let battalions and companies do its work.

The farther back you go into service elements, the worse it gets. The technical services of the army exist solely to serve the front line. Forward elements should never need to stock items for their own protection for fear of slowness in the services. But combat units must limit their demands on the technical services to the absolutely essential items.

Recently in Korea, as during World Wars I and II, some service elements issued and wore winter clothing before the front-line soldiers saw it. Our supply system (including post exchange items) must be made so tight that no man takes his cut before it reaches the front-line soldier. Every element behind the main line of resistance must contribute to the needs of that man up front. *What is left,* goes to those in support.

An American thinks he has to have a car, and this carries over into combat. Everybody of any importance from sergeant to colonel thinks he needs a vehicle—maybe to haul special gear or foot-locker. We must learn to walk and travel light. Allocation of vehicles should be adjusted to the actual needs and never to convenience of the individual or unit. Maximum use must be made of motor pools. Too many vehicles—both cargo and passenger—fail to contribute to combat effectiveness.

Our American soldier is underpaid for the efforts he exerts to save or liberate his country. The people try to make this up to him when he goes back to civilian life. The American soldier would be a much better soldier if, in wartime, a sizable amount of his pay were withheld in Soldiers' Deposits or allotments. This amount will differ for combat-support personnel and front-line soldiers. Officers, likewise, should be limited as to the amount of cash they can draw. No officer or soldier should draw more money than he needs.

ALL men must be fighting men and all imbued with the fighting spirit so at any time they can be taken from their specialized or combat-support missions and sent up to fight the enemy. Such troops have saved the day in the past, and still could. A rotation system must be set up so that combat veterans can replace combat-support personnel. There is too loud a cry about lowering combat support efficiency—even before we experiment to see if it works. Certain specialists will have to be exempt, but most of our support personnel could be made into fighters without an appreciable decrease in combat-support efficiency. Only by killing and building up the will to kill, can we win. We are fighting an enemy who has no regard for his life or yours. He operates as often behind the line as he does in front of the line. We must outdo the enemy and convince him that the American soldier always wins. By no means should we lose our American heritage of decency but neither should we be soft. We must return to fundamentals and redesign our Army for the enemy we may fight.

Helicopters have proven their worth in Korea. Here a H-5 ducks over a hill on a mission.

What Helicopters Can Do for Us

Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Matheny, Jr.

The Piasecki HUP-1 light cargo helicopter can carry six persons or three-quarter tons of cargo. The Army has these on order.

This Piasecki experimental job has been dubbed the "Flying Utility Truck." If experiments pan out the detachable pod will be highly useful.

HELICOPTERS are being used on specialized missions in Korea. It is possible that they will complement and gradually replace to a considerable extent the jeeps and trucks of combat divisions.

Not many years ago ground maneuvers were measured by the average distance infantry or cavalry units could march in a day. After the conversion of the Army's combat transport from horses to vehicles, operations were based on the average distance that combat units equipped with truck transport could travel in one day. With helicopters, the future basis for maneuver may be measured by the range of these and other flying machines. How much is guesswork. The increase will be material.

The helicopter will add speed and flexibility to Army tactical operations and battlefield logistical support. Its vertical ascent and descent capabilities, ability to hover, and to land or take off without prepared landing areas, make it usable in all types of terrain and in situations which would

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHARLES W. MATHENY, JR., Infantry, is on duty with the General Staff in Washington.

The Sikorsky H-19 can transport eight to ten men. The Army is also buying these.

The Hiller YH-23 is the jeep of the helicopter field. These are also on order.

not permit the use of conventional aircraft or vehicles. These capabilities exist in both day and night operations. The helicopter can fly at treetop height at speeds ranging from eighty to one hundred thirty miles an hour and land in small clearings. Water obstacles and terrain do not impede it; bad weather can.

Helicopters can be used for short-haul transport in corps, divisions, and smaller tactical units. This gives greater mobility to ground combat operations. Men, matériel, and equipment can be brought to our own front lines rapidly. Such barriers as blown bridges and impassable roads do not exist for helicopters.

The use of helicopters by small units opens new concepts of tactics. A commander may employ his forces in the development of a key terrain feature, or a stubborn center of resistance by rapid air movement instead of by difficult ground maneuver. Helicopter transport can render great assistance in pursuit operations, stopping enemy break-throughs, and in normal maneuver on the battlefield. Isolated ground units can be supplied by helicopters.

THE helicopter used as a "flying ambulance" will replace conventional ambulances in the forward combat areas. This has become most common in Korea. Helicopters pick up the wounded in the front lines and transport litter patients directly to base hospitals in a fraction of the time now required by trucks. In addition to reducing fatalities among the wounded, it will also mean the elimination of many of the intermediate medical installations now required for the processing of the wounded.

When large helicopters are developed, supplies can be moved over rough terrain and water barriers far more expeditiously and economically than by present methods. The logistical support of rapidly advancing troops—a major problem of World War II — may be overcome by the transport helicopters. In addition to providing a faster and more flexible means of transport, many intermedi-

This is an artist's idea of how the Piasecki H-21 could be used in establishing a bridgehead.



Hiller Hornet, a ram jet job powered by two eleven-pound jet engines. Uses are limited by small capacity.

Bell-built H-13B, another flying jeep, now in use in Korea. It can lay wire, direct fire and perform similar jobs.

ate supply points can be eliminated, resulting in considerable savings in manpower and equipment. The consequent reduction of traffic on roads in the combat area would reduce congestion and maintenance problems.

A "flying crane" type of helicopter which can carry heavy equipment over terrain barriers such as rivers, swamps or precipitous mountains is in the works.

In arctic regions, the difficulty of supplying military forces may be largely eliminated by the use of helicopters. During the summer of 1950 an Army mapping outfit in Alaska used helicopters to complement vehicular transport and the engineers were able to do as much work in one summer as would require six seasons.

HELICOPTERS have been extremely useful in Korea where the road and rail system are inadequate and the terrain rough and mountainous. Helicopters have been used to transport outpost and observation groups, facilitate radio communication, lay wire for communications, lay smoke screens, and provide a rapid means of air reconnaissance and observation in forward areas. In addition they have been used for visual flank security, movement of security patrols from one key location to another, evacuation of wounded men from front-line positions under fire, rescue of pilots downed in enemy territory, and—important to doughboys — for flying hot food to men stationed in advanced outposts.

Currently, the Army is organizing transport companies equipped with light cargo helicopters for assignment to divisions. Their primary purpose will be to furnish transport for infantry units. These helicopter transport companies can also perform a variety of short-haul air transport missions for divisions, including the transport of supplies, food, and small arms ammunition. As the lift capabilities of helicopters increase with future developments, it is quite possible that all types of supplies and ammunition can be air transported to speed the advance of a modern army.

Looking to the future, it is not unreasonable to expect that a portion or all of the terrestrial vehicular transport now utilized by ground force combat units will be converted to air transport capable of operating without prepared landing fields. During World War II amphibious vehicles which could operate on land and water were developed and it is probable that an airphibian helicopter which can operate both in the air and on the ground will be developed in the near future. Airphibian craft of the fixed wing type have been developed and this principle might well be adapted to the helicopter.

The Sikorsky H-19 used as an assault transport. The large door permits the rapid unloading of a rifle squad.

The Critics of the Army

Colonel S. L. A. Marshall

When sensationalism is substituted for facts the people are misinformed and the armed services suffer

SOME writers on Korea have made a point about the weight of "old brains" upon the combat forces. I quite agree with them. Seniority and all that goes with it are a terrible handicap to the Army. But I do not know any way to denature human nature. Men in control do not voluntarily renounce power. And currently, we are suffering more from "old brains" in the civilian branches of government than in the military. Industry has not found a way as yet to shunt the older heads aside so that young and active minds will be given greater incentive. Nor can I agree that this is all a simple issue of age *versus* youth. If you mention Alexander and Napoleon you should not forget Blücher and R. E. Lee. Some of the youngest-minded and most original military thinkers I know are generals who have been retired for age.

All my life I have heard civilians rail against the "military mind" and its blighting effect upon our fighting mechanism. I too am a civilian, but I happen to have spent more of the past thirty-four years in intimate contact with the military establishment than perhaps any other civilian not working steadily within it. My assignments have been such as to make my opportunities for observation of work and of attitudes at all military levels practically limitless. My chance to look deeply into matters that might be highly embarrassing to the military has been just as broad. Yet in all this time I have never discovered the "military mind" —if by that term is implied a pattern of thought which is generally reactionary and obscurantist.

True enough, I have met the occasional officer who despised any civilian and treated the national armed force as if it were his private game preserve, with which he should be allowed to do as he pleased. These odd-balls are not less repugnant to me than are the civilians who in yet greater number abhor everything that has to do with the fighting services, while they lack the decency to acknowledge that the thing they profess to hate is the only possible safeguard of all they cherish.

Likewise I have encountered within the armed establishments many men subject to those personal vices which come of life-time labor within an entrenched position. If by nature they were Caspar Milquetoasts, the profession became for them a refuge. They rocked with the grain, accepted higher authority as the voice of God and turned their horns outward toward any policy that might improve our fighting power at the expense of a few of their number. If they were men of unseemly ambition, they quickly mastered what Justice Holmes once described as the "law of the jugular," under which any predator of the great cat family, by knowing where to cut and slash, advances himself by downing some other creature.

BUT there is nothing uniquely military in any of these postures. They are characteristic of a bureaucracy rather than of its armed part alone. The Army is the oldest of our institutions, apart from the Constitution itself. Its officers have longer continuing service than any of the many bodies of civil servants in government. To expect that it can evolve a personnel and doctrinal system through which its governing group will be purged of the contaminations which constipate efficiency in all other branches of government, and which cause higher administrators to hop from job to job like fleas looking for a juicier dog, is confounding to common sense, human experience and the face of Nature itself.

And let me add that most officers in the armed services do not, in my judgment, fit into either of these categories I have described. The greater number is composed of honest, able, patriotic men.

As for the many criticisms of weapons, tactics and their results in Korea, it was my task to analyze these things. And I can say that in what is published about them here at home, there is little disposition to appreciate one governing principle:

Any army, when its fighting numbers are inadequate to the situation, will look bad both as to its tactics and equipment—for so long as the unequal situation continues. And I will repeat that in 1951, the Eighth Army has looked better than any field army I have ever seen in our uniform, as to its weaponing, the use it has made of its weapons, the morale power and courage of its men, its tactics and general doctrine for the conduct of the war, and the defeat of the enemy.

But all of this was in potential from that day last year when we suddenly found ourselves challenged. The doctrine is in no wise different than what has been taught by our schools. Basic infantry and artillery weapons are the same; the augmentation in armored strength, as to numbers and types, had already been projected. The individuals are of the same mass; they have had to learn the hard way how to survive and how to make the best of what had been taught them. It is unfortunate that many men are sacrificed unnecessarily in the early stages of every war, and much equipage is used wrongly, wasted, or lost to our enemies.

YET it has ever been this way; every war is begun badly because armies become slothful in between periods of danger. Men are rotated in and out of tasks which they did not know under pressure conditions. Tried and tested doctrines are neglected; in the competition of new ideas, standards are occasionally weakened. Those who teach too often lack conviction, and do it simply as an exercise. Those who do not absorb fully because they feel that what they hear will never be applied. Material is made obsolete in the name of progress before there is any thorough reckoning of the rate of progress itself. And all who witness from the sidelines remark: "How stupid!"

Yes, indeed, but is it really the fault of the Army itself? As one who at times has hit out against these very things, I maintain that it is invidious to expect the Army to adhere to spartan standards, to act always tough-mindedly and clear-sightfully toward every problem bearing upon the enhancement of its fighting power, and to retain relative freedom of action for itself in these directions, so long as it remains the favorite whipping boy of a democracy that insists on spoiling its youth, eschews any real interest in military affairs and is ever ready to applaud Senator Blowhard's strictures against defense policy, even though he speaks like Parsifal, the Perfect Fool.

Public and, consequently, publisher interest in the normal development of a military policy and program by this country is always at such low ebb that free-lance military critics have to go full-out in the sensationalism to be sure of sales to give them their bread and butter. I for one have never tried to peddle anything in the popular magazine market and therefore I do not speak out of any sense of frustration. I do not believe in a critic having to cut and cobble his ideas to fit some editor's thesis of what is right or wrong with our armed force.

The truth is that much that is published and vouched for as informed criticism is of such a nature as to discourage those who might speak more moderately, but with better information. The consequence is that even in a great national emergency there is no marked improvement in the public's understanding of what is needed if we are to put our house in order.

The armed services are not free of sin. Interservice jealousy and bickering have become worse, rather than better, since unification. This could be stopped if the men at the top willed it, and were quick to admonish or punish, when any subordinate acted contrary to the rule. The amount of slugging, blackguarding and undermining of one service by another which has gone on these past nine months would have been a public scandal, had the public been as interested in building a strong national defense as in running a few gamblers down their ratholes.

And it was worse because so little of it had any basis in fact. No holds have been barred.

The brave and the dead have been callously slandered in this effort by one service or another to inch itself ahead.

And there will be no stopping of it so long as any of those in top position continue to regard the emergency mobilization as a vehicle for promoting their particular interests rather than the nation as a whole.

But to say that these contentions are unavoidable in any system deriving from the human element is to miss the main point that there are many truly inspired leaders in the armed forces, capable of rising above the storm and thinking for the good of all concerned, including the other services. I found such men—many of them—in the Eighth Army in Korea.

REPORT FROM KOREA

WHAT'S RIGHT and WRONG WITH CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

Major Michael J. Dolan

THERE has been loose talk, fiction and few facts, in newspaper reports on tactical air support of ground forces in Korea. Some critics give the impression that the fighter aircraft won the battle. Others minimize the efforts and effect of the tactical air powers.

The truth lies somewhere between these extremes. Air power alone hasn't won a single action against ground troops. But the infantry will be the first to rise up and say that the combination of tactical air and on-the-ground fighting has won many a fight. They will also say that when the weather prevented air support, the infantry found its attack stalled, or had to give ground to an enemy that a few well placed napalm bombs could have defeated.

"Close in" support of front-line infantry by tactical aviation was not used to a great extent by the Allied powers until the closing months of World War II. In the postwar years the concept of strategic bombardment by huge bombers capable of ferrying the "A" bomb non-stop to any target on the globe captured the imagination (and a large slice of the national defense budget) of military and government officials alike. The Marine Corps continued to realize the immense value of close tactical aviation and they developed the air-ground team to a high degree of proficiency. After the divorce of the Army and the Air Force the spark was kept alive

MAJOR MICHAEL J. DOLAN, Infantry, was G-3 Air, 2d Infantry Division, in Korea. Our latest communication from him was posted from the Percy Jones Army Hospital, Battle Creek, Michigan.

Napalm bursts into flames on a communist stronghold. Not a few of the heavy casualties suffered by the enemy are inflicted by napalm strikes.



by the establishment of a JOC (Joint Operations Center) at Pope Field, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, staffed by Army personnel from V Corps and Air Force pilots from Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. Here the doctrine of close tactical air support was nurtured, tested, revised, and retested in field exercises, such as Swarmer and Portrex. Meanwhile, at service schools of both the Army and Air Force some thought was given to tactical air doctrine in lectures and occasional demonstrations. But each school had its own ideas.

Exercises Swarmer and Portrex pointed up the need for the training of the Army in the use of air power in support of ground attacks. A program for such training was then developed. This came belatedly. The implementing document was hardly printed when we found ourselves involved in Korea.

Doctrine in Action

Shortly after the first American troops landed in Korea, the Eighth Army and the Fifth Air Force laid the ground work for what has since become the Joint Operations Center. When the first forward air controller joined the 24th Infantry Division, close tactical air support began in earnest.

The only equipment for ground-to-air communication in the theater was the VHF trans-ceiver, the SCR 522, a four channel radio, and the SCR 191, an HF radio for ground-to-ground communication. Both radios were mounted in the back seat of a ¼-ton vehicle. The performance of the SCR 522 in combat conditions was not good, as will be seen in more detail later. A further method of communication between Division G-3 air and JOC was the SCR 399 radio, mounted in a conventional truck van.

Mountainous terrain and inexperienced operators combined to prevent the use of voice radio to JOC, so messages had to be sent by combat wire in code. This made delays of many hours in sending and receiving messages through the SCR 399. And it found both G-3 air and JOC relying more and more on ground lines, thus badly overburdening these facilities. This was remedied when trained crews arrived from the 20th Signal Air-Ground Liaison Company in early October with fairly new equipment and telephone "patches," and direct voice radio contact between JOC and Division became possible.

At first, one TACP (Tactical Air Control Party) was assigned to each division—one officer (an experienced fighter pilot) and two airmen (one a radio operator, the other a radio mechanic). As the withdrawing American and ROK troops moved south toward Pusan, and as fast as combat experienced pilots could be spared from their squadrons, more TACP's were assigned until there were four for each division (one with each regiment plus a division net control). This ratio has been maintained, although there is talk of increasing the total to six parties, the two extra teams to be held at division for special missions.

Owing to the mountainous terrain as the battle shifted south, ground controllers found it harder and harder to direct fighter aircraft visually onto enemy targets and still keep their radio vehicles in defiladed positions. To offset this, the division light aviation sections found that by putting the proper crystals in the VHF radio sets in their L-5s (liaison planes) they could communicate with fighter aircraft and act as airborne controllers picking up targets beyond the range of organic artillery. Calling them-

A tactical air control party directs a strike in Korea. The crew consists of an Air Force lieutenant and two sergeants.

selves by such expressive names as "Horsefly," "Pickle-barrel," and "Pineapple," they did first-rate work in directing air strikes.

It was while the battle to save Taegu was raging that the Air Force created its famous "Mosquito" squadron, to take over the duties of airborne control. For this purpose, the unarmed T-6 was used, with a fighter pilot at the controls and a trained observer in the rear seat. The Mosquitos were given definite sectors to cover each day; and as new divisions arrived they were assigned to fly the same front each day in order to become familiar with every mountain and gully in that area.

The advent of the Mosquito ship created, for a time, a dual control in the air. It was weeks before the L-5 pilots could be made to accept the inevitable and give up their direction of fighter aircraft for the more prosaic but highly important missions of directing field artillery fire and making reconnaissance flights along the divisional fronts.

AT first it was thought that a twelve-day tour of duty for tactical air control parties assigned to front-line divisions would be about right. But it was found that parties came up for rotation almost before they could get acquainted with the terrain or with infantry regiments to which they were attached. So the tour was upped to fifteen days and finally to twenty-one. The results have been highly satisfactory, with the infantry showing the air force how it operates and the pilot and his airmen giving the infantrymen a new slant and a greater appreciation of the worth of the air arm.

A large percentage of the members of TACP's have been awarded or recommended for decorations ranging from the Commendation Ribbon to the Silver Star by infantry regimental commanders. Illustrative of camaraderie that develops from such association is the story of the fighter pilot who, as forward controller with a regiment, twice rescued Company K from annihilation by the Chinese Communists in the action northeast of Kunu-Ri. Shortly after that pilot's tour had ended, the regimental S-3 got a phone call from a nearby fighter base, requesting that a vehicle be sent to the airfield to pick up certain items for the regiment. The items included five quarts of prime whiskey for Company K and steaks for the whole outfit, plus items of wearing apparel to replace those the unit had lost in a withdrawal.

Aerial Artillery

Tactical air support doctrine teaches that all available ground weapons such as mortars and artillery, will engage ground targets, and that air will only be called on after those weapons prove unable to neutralize the target. But more often than not, in Korea, tactical air has been used as aerial artillery, substituting for the non-existent (in August and September) long-range corps artillery that normally reinforces and deepens the fires of divisional artillery. In the early days of the fighting fighter aircraft usually were directed against what under normal circumstances were plainly artillery targets. This situation was brought about by the greatly extended fronts held by all divisions. Their length prohibited the massing of fires of more than two battalions of artillery on a lucrative target.

One division front, for example, was thirty-seven miles from flank to flank, with only ten batteries of the normal twelve available to cover this frontage. Normal interdiction missions were out of the question with such a frontage to cover. The Air Force had to be relied on to deny avenues of approach to the enemy. This proved only partly successful, for air support was generally limited to daylight hours (on close support work only, of course; night fighters and bombers continued their work on deep penetration missions). And often poor weather forced the cancelling of missions. Again, artillery ammunition in the Korean theater was definitely in short supply and G-4 had to clamp on a stern rationing program to keep available a reserve for emergencies. Thus many air strikes were delivered against targets that could have been taken under fire by artillery but were not, simply because the Air Force had more high explosives to expend than the ground force.

Air Support of Armor

Although you can get an argument (and probably a bloody head) from any armored enthusiast on whether Korea is tank country, the fact remains that only organic division armor (tank battalion and the three regimental tank companies) have been used, and then only in close support of the infantry in defensive and attack phases. Experts point out that Korea's rugged terrain and endless rice paddies, combined with a wretched road net serve effectively to deny avenues of approach to armor except along the few good roads.

Although the T/O&E authorizes

Interior of an SCR 399 radio van used by G-3 air to call for air support. It is also tied in with JOC.

each division's heavy tank battalion a VHF radio (ANARC 3), no provision is made for either VHF radio operators or mechanics. One division managed to gets its set mounted in a tank and obtained two common frequency channels so that they could monitor the chatter of fighter aircraft. But even this dubious pleasure was denied when the set broke down (as it did very soon) and there were no spare parts or competent mechanics. Tanks, then, had to depend on the infantry units they worked with to get fighter protection. From this experience it seems plain that either some provision should be made to rid the tank battalion of a useless (at present) piece of expensive radio equipment, or else provide the necessary operators and mechanics.

Requesting Air Strikes

Figures will help make clear the way air strikes are called for and controlled. The normal control net includes a tactical air control party with each regiment, plus one at division, working out of the G-3 air as net control, with one and sometimes two Mosquito airborne controllers (T-6 aircraft) flying the division sector, searching for suitable air targets.

At the division command post is the air liaison officer (ALO) working hand-in-glove with the division G-3 air. The ALO is a fighter pilot with considerable combat experience. His duties include acting as advisor to the division G-3 on ordnance loads carried by different types of aircraft, and as chief controller of all TACP's assigned to work with the division. He sees to it that the TACP's select the best positions for using and protecting their equipment. He confers with the G-3 air to insure that the air support is used effectively and that targets are actually worth attacking. The ALO is assigned to division for the duration, in contrast to the members of TACP's who are rotated back to their units after three weeks of front-line work.

Targets are picked up in many ways—by mosquito aircraft, by observers flying division light aircraft, and by field artillery and infantry forward observers. Once the target is located, every possible attempt is made to knock it out with infantry or artillery weapons. If these can't do it then a request for air goes to the division G-3 air by radio or telephone.

But before the target can be struck, certain minor but extremely important steps have to be taken. G-3 air must check the target with G-2 and G-3 as to its tactical value. The ALO in turn checks to see whether the target can be controlled by the TACP or handled by the Mosquito pilot. It also determines whether the target area is within or beyond the bomb-line. The bomb-line, or as it is called in Korea, the green line, is a line recognizable from the air, at least 1,000 yards in front of the most advanced friendly elements. Behind this line, air strikes can be made only if they are controlled either from ground or air. Beyond it no control is required. The green line generally follows such easily spotted features as trails, roads, stream lines and ridges.

Once the checking at division has been completed (the whole process takes much less time than it does to tell about it) fighter aircraft are requested from the JOC through the G-3 air request net, consisting of the SCR 399 specifically for that purpose. It's important for this request to include a complete description and the exact location so the operations officer at JOC can determine the best ordnance loads for the aircraft. JOC tries to send the right kind of planes with the right kind of armament—for example, planes armed with rockets against tanks or self-propelled guns, napalm for open intrenchments.

IN the eyes of the people at JOC it is a cardinal sin to call for air support when there isn't any target, just to have some air support available. A division G-3 air can get away with it a time or two. But he soon finds that he has established a reputation for crying wolf. Then, when he gets into a really tight squeeze, JOC is naturally inclined to discount the urgency, figuring he is only "pressing the panic button" again. Once he has earned a reputation for calling on air support only when he actually needs it, a G-3 air will find he is listened to with respect. He will get all possible air without question.

JOC was mentioned early in this article. A detailed account of the set-up of the Joint Operations Center in Korea would be out of place here, but a quick look at it is necessary to understand its relation to the other sections that make up the whole air-ground system.

The JOC in Korea is an installation where combat intelligence and operations of both air and ground forces are brought together. Physically located in a part of Fifth Air Force Headquarters, it is also near Eighth Army headquarters. Staffed by an equal number of Army and Air Force officers, it is the central spot reached by all requests for air strikes and reconnaissance and from which all fighter or reconnaissance aircraft are dispatched.

Requests for fighter air received at JOC are processed and assessed against the priority established by Eighth Army and the availability of aircraft. Planes report in to the Tactical Air Control Center by radio. They are then directed by orders transmitted from JOC, to report in to the division net control station of the unit next on the list to get fighter help. As the aircraft arrive approximately over the division they are going to support, the flight leader makes radio contact with the net control. He is then directed to check in with either the TACP with the regiment or the mosquito airborne controller. When the strike is over, the flight leader checks out with division control first, giving a strike report on the results observed. All this is done every time a flight checks into the division area.

Strike Results

One extremely vexing problem during the earliest days of Korea was the inability of the division TACP to get timely reports on air strikes made in the division's sector. Mosquito often had to handle as many as four flights at one time. Or it might be working flights on targets miles out in front of the net control station, and when it checked out of the area was often too low on fuel to stay around giving out a detailed report.

One division solved this through use of a standard questioning technique like this:

FLIGHT LEADER: Roger. Dynamo [Division] this is Admiration Love [Flight Call Sign].

CONTROL: Admiration Love this is Dynamo Control. Request number of aircraft, type and load.

FLIGHT LEADER: Roger, Dynamo Control, this is Admiration Love. Four Fox 51s with napalm, rockets and .50 calibers. Do you have a target for me?

CONTROL: Roger. Admiration Love, understand. Report to Dennis 14 [TACP] vicinity of Baker Victor 4897. Request strike results when you check out of the area.

This paid off. It cut radio chatter to a minimum and got the required information across. Even if control forgot to ask for results, chances were that flight leader would call them in before he checked his outfit out of the area. Similar questioning methods were also used with mosquito pilots. The information was passed on at once to the G-2 and G-3 of division.

Pre-Planned Missions

Air-ground joint doctrine on operations neatly divides missions of tactical air into two broad categories: immediate and pre-planned missions. Pre-planned missions are favored, naturally, by higher headquarters, over immediate support mission. The first kind allows at least twenty-four hours for preparation. The other is strictly for targets of opportunity that develop along the front.

Pre-planning gives enough time for pilots to be thoroughly briefed, proper bomb loads to be selected, and plans made by the air to tackle the target in the most effective way. But many times in Korea, aircraft briefed beforehand on a particular target arrived over the area only to find the target wasn't there. Hard feelings can develop if this happens very often. So the pre-briefed close-support mission has fallen into disfavor, and pre-planned missions are held to such targets as villages, bridges, and the like. These things can't get up and walk away between the time a strike is requested and delivered.

One good example of the fallacy of pre-planned missions happened outside the town of Anui, on the road to the west coast city of Chonju. Just at dusk, G-2 observers flying in light aircraft saw a roadblock, manned by an estimated reinforced enemy battalion, in a mountain pass through which the division was to attack the next day. Arrangements were made through corps G-3 air for an air strike by napalm, at 0900 the next day. It was estimated that by that time the ground fog would be burned off and friendly troops would be near the block, ready to exploit the shock effect of the strike.

Next morning Mosquito checked in and got orders to orbit over the roadblock site ready to pick up the incoming fighter aircraft. But only ten minutes before the fighters checked in, Mosquito called in to say there was little movement in the roadblock positions. The flight was allowed to hit the target because it was too late to call it off. But when the ground outfits swarmed through the place a few minutes later, they found only a few scattered enemy. The unpredictable Koreans had pulled out by night, abandoning a position where they might have delayed us at least twenty-four hours.



Major Dolan, the author of this article, points to net control system for division air support.

Another drawback to the pre-planned close support mission is the weather. When Eighth Army prepared for the breakout of the Pusan perimeter, each division was allotted certain pre-planned strikes which were to coincide with the jump-off plans. In one division, a carpet bombing attack by B-29s was to precede its attack, but cloudy weather forced postponement of the strike. Meanwhile the other divisions were to attack at the same time, and take advantage of the fighter strikes allocated to them. In one division, particularly, the air was pre-briefed to put on a half-hour show, starting at 0700, after which the infantry units would jump off. At 0645, although the weather over the division front was clear, no aircraft had arrived. And at 0700 still no aircraft. Frantic calls to JOC revealed that the Japanese bases of our fighter aircraft were "socked in." By then it was too late to call off the attack. So the regiments moved out minus air support. But luckily the weather soon cleared up enough to let the aircraft get airborne, and fifteen minutes after the attack began, fighters did appear over the target.

Flying Weather

Weather in Korea, especially flying weather, has been the number one subject of infantry conversation. During the lean days along the Naktong-Taegu-Pohang line, when artillery support was at a minimum and fighting troops hadn't yet been reinforced enough for a break-out, the Air Force furnished the offensive striking force. Bad weather grounding the aircraft, or cloudy weather over target areas meant that the enemy could shift his forces and move his supplies without fear of detection. But despite the terrific handicap of weather, fighter pilots and bomber pilots alike have done and are continuing to do a magnificent job of close tactical air support for the front-line troops. Until late in September there were few fields for aircraft on the Korean peninsula itself, and only a limited number of F-51 Mustangs could be accommodated at Taegu and Pohang. With the opening of airfields in Pusan and the recapture of Suwon and Kimpo bases, aircraft no longer had to make the long flight to and from Japan, thus allowing fighters to fly two and even three misions a day instead of one.

As a real defense of the Air Force —which has been sniped at a great

deal about its close tactical air support—I would like to point out that such criticism seems to arise from sources other than the front-line troops themselves. The fighting man will tell you of the many times he has seen fighter pilots flying in his close support in weather when the birds themselves were grounded. Time and again the combat pilot has appeared over the battle area in the most wretched flying weather imaginable —and pulled the troops out of dangerous situations.

Types of Aircraft

Jet fighters such at the F-80 and the F-84, and propeller-driven aircraft such as the F-51, the F-4U, plus various Navy planes have all been used. Besides these, the B-26, nominally a light bomber, has been used successfully in close support. The F-84 appeared in Korean skies later.

The F-80 "Shooting Star" got a lot of unfair newspaper and magazine publicity during the early stages and the writers should have known better. A number of reports on jet attacks against Korean armor said the rockets didn't knock out the tanks and foolishly blamed the jets instead of the rockets. This was remedied when fresh stocks of rockets with shaped charge warheads were rushed from the U.S. Principal limitation of the jet in the early days was its inability to stay over the target area for any length of time. It used up so much fuel in the long flight from Japan. But when the jets were equipped with large-capacity tip tanks, that problem was minimized. And with the establishment of suitable landing fields in Korea it disappeared.

F-51 Mustangs built up an impressive record as close support planes and so did the Marine-Navy F-4U Corsair. Every bit of the praise accorded them is certainly their due. But we should remember that if the enemy had enough jet fighters, the use of propeller-driven aircraft would have been greatly curtailed.

The important thing is not to be lulled into believing that because an outmoded plane performed successfully, such a plane is *the* aircraft for support of ground troops. The Air Force believes its new F-84E, capable of carrying thirty-two rockets (the F-51 carries only six) may be the answer to the ground forces' need for an aircraft capable of carrying heavy fuel and armament at high rates of speed, yet possessing the ability to slow down sufficiently over the target to get strike accuracy. B-26s did yeoman work in close support. Their ability to carry several kinds of bomb loads, including napalm, fragmentation bombs, 500-pound bombs, and para-frag bombs, and their king-size fuel capacity made this plane a favorite. Yet the B-26 was extremely vulnerable to ground fire at low altitudes.

A jet pilot on ground duty as air liaison officer points to the location of a planned air strike.

The use of napalm deserves mention. Napalm consists of a substance resembling dry gelatine mixed with gasoline to form a jelly-like and highly volatile mixture. This is loaded into pod-like tanks suspended from the wings of the aircraft. It has to be used within twenty-four hours of mixing or the mass separates and becomes useless. Detonation is accomplished by impact fuzes.

Flaming napalm has a two-edged effect. It splashes a fiery liquid of 2,000-degree heat which consumes or burns all that it touches. And it strikes fear into the hearts of the enemy when it bursts on or near their positions. Captured enemy documents attest to the high rate of casualties directly due to napalm, and show that owing to shortages of soothing oils little relief could be given napalm casualties. In the drive toward Seoul the matériel damage from napalm was clearly apparent in burned-out tanks, trucks and gun emplacements. Enemy soldiers still crouched in the attitudes in which the fiery death found them.

The sound of a high-speed aircraft strafing a mountain ridge, with the echo of the .50-caliber machine guns and high-velocity rockets resounding through the valley is one of war's most terrifying sounds. Officer prisoners said that the casualty effect was not as great as that of napalm but that the psychological effect was so great that they had to kick men out of their holes to get them moving after a strafing run.

Identification

There is no guaranteed way of accurately establishing ground-unit identification for close-support aircraft, or of pointing out enemy targets accurately and positively. Every unit in Korea has tried to find a workable system—with varying results.

Usually friendly troop locations are identified by the display of a panel code. This works out well enough in identifyng troops as actually friendly. But it isn't fool-proof for the reason that the enemy has almost as many panels as we have. And he has the ability to display the correct code with disconcerting regularity.

One proposed solution for identifying the *most advanced* elements of friendly ground troops to Mosquito and fighter aircraft is to have several riflemen carry the large Signal Corps

panel directly behind the attacking troops. But this system has been checkmated by the enemy. They expose a similar panel and thus confuse the attacking planes.

The most likely answer is the system now in use in one division. An individual pocket panel of red cloth, about 24 inches by 24 inches, is carried by all members of rifle and weapons squads of rifle platoons, and by forward observers of mortar squads of heavy-weapons companies and mortar companies. The platoon leaders carefully supervise the display of these bands. They make sure that only the most advanced elements lay them out.

This provides a dotted line of red that traces the friendly front lines, and enables fighter aircraft to work much closer to friendly troops without hitting them. Tests in two big battles have shown that the individual pocket panel may well be the answer to friendly troop identification. The cloth panels can also be laid side by side to make a long panel. They can also be used to form the code symbols if a unit is cut off or surrounded. This has the added advantage of security in that the enemy wouldn't hesitate to display a single cloth panel but would hesitate to display a tracing of his whole front line to unfriendly eyes.

Pointing out enemy targets to fighter aircraft takes a lot of time, especially when the enemy is using camouflage. The most popular method of indicating targets is the use of white phosphorus shells fired from high-angle or flat-trajectory weapons. This has its hazards. The enemy, realizing the use of the WP for marking purposes, often counters by dropping round for round on friendly front lines.

Mosquito aircraft have been successful in using colored smoke bombs dropped from the T-6. They use the smoke as a reference point and direct the fighters by voice. A new type of smoke rocket similar to those mounted on fighter aircraft is being used. It is mounted under the wings of the T-6 and fired electrically. The target itself is hit, which helps the fighter pilots.

The surest method of identification from the ground has been found to be the marking of the target with colored smoke. The enemy in Korea seems to have a very small supply of this stuff. So he can't very often throw a similar and confusing answer back on our own troop positions.

Communications

The communications system is the heart of ground-air effectiveness. The success or failure of close tactical air support rests primarily on communication equipment and its use. It is, unfortunately, a long ways from perfect.

Equipment in use at the time I write is the same as we had last summer—what we had when World War II ended. It is outmoded and parts were not available in the Far East. So the SCR 522 VHF radio has been kept operational only through a rare combination of developed skill on the part of radio mechanics and the grace of God.

The TACP's sent out with divisions had little experience with the SCR 522. They tried hard enough but they never seemed able to keep the set operating on more than one channel. And to compound their woes, the ¼-ton trucks that furnished the power for the transmitter had seen better days as long ago as 1943. After less than a month of constant use, the radios and vehicles alike were ready for replacement. But no replacements were available. Dynamotors burned out under twelve-hour-a-day operation. And every jeep developed a peculiar sound of its own, as its motor had to be run far above normal idling speed to furnish transmitter power.

After four months of battle testing it can be said that the VHF radio with its present mounting system is too delicate for combat. The M39 personnel carrier is being tested to see if it provides a more stable platform and reliable source of power. Reports indicate that it, too, has serious drawbacks.

Even the shortest moves on the primitive Korean roads tend to throw the SCR 522 out of tune, thus requiring a retuning before transmitting further messages. Spare dynamotors, fuses of all amperages, and tubes were and are in critically short supply.

Korea is a land of mountains. The VHF radio is a "line of sight" set. So it would work only when it was high enough up to clear the ridges between the forward TACP's and the division net control TACP. Often the only way Mosquito or fighter aircraft could make contact was to fly right over the location of the TACP.

I do not intend to belittle the equipment now in use in ground-to-air communication. My purpose is simply to stress the fact that successful tactical air support by the Air Force has been achieved in spite of the equipment we have.

One of the great needs in communications equipment is for a lightweight, portable VHF set which would enable the forward air controller to leave his vehicle and direct fighter aircraft from an observation post. Attempts are being made to secure the AN/TRC 7 radio, which may serve the purpose. But once again trained mechanics will be needed to keep the sets operating. And a good store of spare parts will have to be kept at hand.

One disheartening aspect is the lack of new equipment—lightweight radar for tactical air direction posts, blind bombing and navigational equipment, and other items that could be field-tested in Korean combat under conditions no laboratory or stateside maneuver could ever duplicate.

Looking Ahead

Close tactical air support of ground forces has come of age. Hard-bitten regimental commanders have learned to fit the new concept into their scheme of maneuver. They have found close air support to be the additional striking force and shock action they need to drive the enemy off his positions and deny him freedom to maneuver, unhampered in his rear areas.

Tactical air support is here to stay. It is extremely effective. But a great deal still remains to be accomplished in training troops and commanders now in the United States in the effective uses of tactical air power. Even with outmoded equipment, tactical air support of ground forces has been truly amazing. When the equipment problem is fully solved—it can be—and when there are many well-trained and skilled operators in using close tactical air support, the fighting ground soldier will truly have a potent weapon at his service.

Armor, artillery, infantry, and tactical air power can give the United States four hard-hitting arms, combined into an unsurpassed fighting force.

Photograph by Karsh, Ottawa

GI's GENERAL

Selected paragraphs from "A Soldier's Story"

How Soldiers Are Made

One Sunday evening in the late spring of 1911 John Crewson, a Moberly house mover and superintendent of the Sunday School of the Campbellite Christian Church to which I belonged, asked why I did not apply for an appointment to West Point. He knew of my love for the out-of-doors, a heritage left me by my father who took me hunting as a child.

"But I couldn't afford to go to West Point," I told him. "If I get to the university, I'll have a hard enough time earning my way."

"You don't pay to go to West Point, Omar," Mr. Crewson explained, "the army pays you while you're there." With that I picked up a freshened interest in a possible career as a soldier.

Leadership

A soldier's first few weeks in the army ordinarily leave him baffled and homesick. Knowing that these men on their arrival at Camp Claiborne would probably be depressed by the impersonal routine that changes a man into a soldier, we had laid plans to organize them immediately into units they could call home. Teams of officers and noncoms boarded those trains at the reception centers and classified the men for future assignments. Washington learned of our traveling classification teams and the practice later became a standard operating procedure.

As the trains backed into Claiborne, we greeted them with a brass band. Cadres formed them into companies and batteries and marched them off to their hutments. There they found clean beds and in the mess halls, hot meals. Laundry services were speeded up to get their travel-soiled uniforms cleaned. Each man was issued the division's All-American shoulder patch. [*March 1942*]

"My Outfit"

One day as I drove from the Corps CP in Pietraperzia (I called it Peter Piper) to the 45th Division, I picked up a hitchhiker on his way to the front. He was wearing the jump boots and high-buttoned tunic of the 82d.

"Where are you headed?" I asked.

"Up to join my outfit, sir."

"But the 82d's out on the other end of the island—"

"Yessir," he replied, "but I parachuted down on the 45th and I thought I'd string along with 'em."

I smiled in spite of myself. "And where are you coming from now?"

"The hospital, sir. I'm AWOL from the hospital but I had to bust out before they ran me through that repple depple routine. Otherwise I would never have gotten back to my old outfit."

"Wounded?" I asked him.

"Just pinked me. It's all patched up now."

"You know you've probably been reported by the 82d as missing in action when you failed to show up after the jump. Don't you think your folks will be worried?" He shrugged his shoulders.

"Give me your name," I said, "and I'll see to it that you're removed from the missing rolls." I turned it over to corps G-1. [*Sicily, July 1943*]

Bright Young Bird

Our situation might have been even more critical had we not beached an emergency reserve in a dozen giant sea-going barges. Several months before the invasion, I had recommended to Ike that he take this precaution and tow a barge-loaded reserve of ammunition across the Channel. There were no 1,000-ton barges in England and he wired to Washington for them. General Brehon Somervell, Chief of the Services of Supply, sped them to us and we put 12,000 tons on the beaches.

Several years after the war a shipper in New York City mentioned to me one evening that he had been cleaned out of his biggest barges only a few weeks before the invasion.

"Had to tow them across the Atlantic," he said with a smile. "We figured some bright young bird on Eisenhower's staff sold Washington on a cock-eyed idea. Was I right?"

"Yes, sir," I colored. "You were."

[England, Winter 1944]

From *A Soldier's Story*. By General Omar N. Bradley. Copyright, 1951, by Henry Holt & Co., New York. Published by permission of the author and publisher. *A Soldier's Story* ($5.00) may be purchased from the Combat Forces Book Service or at any book store.

Selectivity

Picking our way through the transport area, we located the *Augusta* just as a star shell broke in the sky. A line of tracers arced skyward. The enemy had come in for its nightly raid.

The skipper grabbed for his megaphone and hailed the *Augusta*.

"Ahoy—can we come aboard?"

"Lie off," the deck called back, "lie off until we get an all clear."

I had confessed before to uneasiness in an air raid afloat. But if afloat we were to be, I preferred the 9,000-ton *Augusta* to this seagoing hot-rod. For twenty minutes we idled in a tight circle. When the raid appeared to slacken, we hove to the *Augusta* once more.

"Lie off," the answer came back. "Lie off."

"But we've got passengers aboard," our skipper shouted through the darkness.

"Prisoners?" the deck called, with a note of curiosity. "Stand by to bring the prisoners aboard."

I climbed a rope ladder up the *Augusta's* side and crawled over the rail, cold, wet, hungry, and tired.

The crew pressed forward to see its "prisoners."

"Oh balls," a sailor grunted, "it's only General Bradley." [*Off Normandy, 6 June 1944*]

Security

To identify hills, road junctions, and towns without giving our plans away in the event of an enemy tap on the wire, I had key features numbered on my war map and gave copies of those numbers to the division commanders. It was a makeshift private code, lax enough to cause Dickson worry over the security of our plans.

One morning when I called Allen, he referred to an obscure crossroad by its number in this private code.

"Just a minute, Terry," I said. "can't find that number on my map."

"Well, listen carefully, Brad," he said, "The enemy may be cutting in. I'll say the name of the place as fast as I can."

Dickson overheard this conversation and threw up his hands. "Security wouldn't be much of a problem," he said, "If only there were fewer generals in the army." [Tunisia, 1943]

Logic

Anticipating that General Marshall might look critically on these tightly packed truck columns, I thought it better to explain the offense soon after we started. Originally we had sought to enforce road discipline on the beachhead by insisting upon the conventional 70-foot interval between trucks. The drivers simply ignored these instructions and herded their vehicles bumper to bumper.

"They're practical soldiers," I exclaimed. "If they're strafed or bombed just once—they'll never again bunch up this way. But if I were to give them the devil now for closing up the way they do, they'd probably look at me and say to themselves: "Doesn't that damn fool know the Luftwaffe is *kaput*?" [*Normandy, 12 June 1944*]

CP

Because the battle had now outrun Beja, I shifted the Corps CP to Sidi Nsir under the shadow of Hill 609. After a day in the field I returned to find that the commandant had hidden our headquarters far back in a narrow gulch between two steep hills. There it was bottlenecked by a single exit, and only a few enemy bombs could have demolished the installation.

The commandant looked unhappy when I called him to my tent. "Let's get out of this damned canyon in the morning," I said, "and spread the CP on the open side of the hill outside. This place looks as though we're scared to death someone might find us. By golly, I'd be ashamed to be found in such a place."

The shift started at dawn and by 10 we were dispersed on the forward slope of an open hill facing 609. Eisenhower arrived for lunch at noon. He looked approvingly around the landscape where our CP stood boldly on the hill as if to defy enemy air attack.

"Brad," he clasped me on the shoulder, "I'm sure glad to see you spread out like this in the open. Once when I visited Fredendall in his CP near Tebessa I found II Corps dug into the damnedest canyon you ever saw."

Kean glanced my way and smiled. I held a poker face and admitted nothing. [Africa, 1943]

Priority

I hailed a lift ashore aboard a passing LCM draped with the coxswain's washing. Near shore we spotted a DUKW and I called the driver for a lift dry-shod to the beach.

"Sure, General," he called, "jump aboard."

"Can you run me on to General Collins' headquarters?" I asked.

The driver shook his head. "Like nothing better, General," he answered, "but my captain would give me hell. He told me to hustle right back from this run."

I did not dispute his captain's orders; on D plus 1 rank could not compete with the priority importance of tonnage. Pleased at having avoided a soaking in the surf, I jumped off on the beach and hitched a ride on a passing weasel. [*Off Normandy, 6 June 1944*]

Tanks

A tank is brutally effective in offensive warfare. In the defense it becomes effective only when pooled in reserve behind the line for use in counterattacking an infantry or armored breakthrough. But where the tank is employed in lieu of infantry simply to hold a defensive position, it becomes a wasted and uneconomic weapon.

Wine Ration

Among the troops in Normandy, Cherbourg's strategic worth was soon overshadowed by the wealth of its booty and it was there that the term "liberate" came into popular use in the army. Von Schleiben's forces had thoughtfully stocked their underground shelters for a prolonged campaign—and for what could have been a historic binge. And while they scrupulously complied with orders to demolish the port's installations, their soldiers' hearts rebelled at the sacrilege of destroying or spilling good wine and brandy. As a result we fell heir not only to a transatlantic port but to a massive underground wine cellar as well.

Word of the prize leaked out even before the fighting ended and the scroungers scurried into position for a claims race into those caves. Here was a problem for which the school at Leavenworth had not prepared me and I went to Ike for help. He approved our recommendation that the booty be padlocked for equitable distribution to the divisions. Had we left the distribution to chance the rear echelons would have made off with those stores, while the divisions that took them went dry. For once, however, the combat troops shared equally in the gratitude of France. My share of the cache was a half a case of champagne which Collins sent me and which I saved and carried home from the war for the christening of my grandson. [*June 1944*]

Mobility

"How about you, Gee?" I asked, "when can you move V Corps headquarters ashore?"

"Early in the morning, Brad. We'll have our communications in by then."

"To hell with your communications—"

Gerow grinned. "We'll set up on the beach tonight." [Normandy, 6 June 1944]

Where the Heart Is

There are those who contend that the best strategist is the commander most distantly removed from his troops. For where units exist merely as symbols on a map the strategist can perform in a vacuum and his judgment cannot be infected by compassion for his troops. If war were fought with push-button devices, one might make a science of command. But because war is as much a conflict of passion as it is of force, no commander can become a strategist until first he knows his men. Far from being a handicap to command, compassion is the measure of it. For unless one values the lives of his soldiers and is tormented by their ideals, he is unfit to command. He is unfit to appraise the cost of an objective in terms of human life.

To spend lives, knowingly, deliberately—even cruelly—he must steel his mind with the knowledge that to do less would cost only more in the end. For if he becomes tormented by the casualties he must endure, he is in danger of losing sight of his strategic objective. Where the objective is lost, the war is prolonged and the cost becomes infinitely worse.

Eisenhower found as I did that the well-springs of humility lie in the field. For however arduous the task of a commander, he cannot face the men who shall live or die by his orders without sensing how much easier is his task than the one he has set them to perform.

Atomic Bomb

Uncertain as to whether a soldier saluted his Commander-in-Chief, I played safe and braced inside the office door. The President called hello from across his desk and waved me to a seat. His huge head and massive shoulders overshadowed the cluttered array of knickknacks on the desk top.

I had been told the President was especially interested in hearing how our troops had seasoned in battle. I made my report brief and to the point. He followed me intently with a remarkable understanding of military problems in the field.

Then almost before I was aware of what had happened, the President had reversed our roles and he was briefing me. America's scientific resources, he said, had been recruited in a staggering project to unlock the secrets of nuclear fission. He believed they could produce a weapon that would totally revolutionize warfare.

The President called it an "atom bomb."

At the moment, however, he was worried for fear the Germans might have outstripped us in the development of an atom bomb of their own. Intelligence reports had pointed to Trondheim, Norway, where the enemy was known to be producing "heavy water." He wanted me to know what we were doing in the event we were confronted by a similar German weapon on the invasion of France.

[Washington, September 1943]

Cliques

At the same time the 28th Division was afflicted with the problem of companies in which home-town cliques still survived. When noncom vacancies developed in those units, the stripes ordinarily went to the home-town boys. Moreover, civilian associations between officers and men in those companies made discipline more difficult to maintain. While commanders disapproved of the favoritism that ensued, they seemed powerless to halt it. I concluded that as long as we tolerated those neighborhood clubs, we could never have a division.

To correct the condition I resorted to a drastic move and in a single order transferred every officer and almost every noncom out of his home-town unit. Later that summer the traffic in divisional transfers slowed down, and shortly before we left for maneuvers in the fall of 1942 we were assigned a complement of brand-new lieutenants fresh from the officer candidate schools. The division took new heart and the 28th soon began to show the keen edge of a trained combat team.

During a routine visit to the maneuver area that fall, Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, Commanding General of Army Ground Forces, suggested that I might soon be ready to take command of a corps.

[*Camp Claiborne, La., 1942*]

Solving the 6400-mil Nemesis

Lieutenant Edward T. Klett, Jr.

Here's a solution for that dilemma of the airborne artilleryman: How to give fire support when the front lines are nowhere and everywhere.

WITH the development of the "heavy-drop" techniques, artillery weapons are now parachuted to earth with the paratroopers who man them. This has brought the parachute artillery into its normal role of close-support of the airborne infantry. However, aside from their spectacular mode of travel to their battery areas, the flying redlegs have been faced with several new problems not normally considered SOP in most groundbound outfits.

The airborne artilleryman usually finds himself in a situation where he is surrounded by the enemy; there is no definite direction to the front lines; there is no particular sector of fire; and he usually has a wide choice of directions in which to lay his battery. Like many of the artillerymen in Korea, he frequently has to fight as a doughboy, but in Korea, artillerymen have had a pretty good idea in which direction the front lines should be.

The present tactical concept of artillery doesn't deal adequately with the problem of preparing an artillery battery to fire throughout a completely circular area with but little notice of large deflection shifts.

Though there are 64 mils in a complete circle, the panoramic sight which we use on our current artillery weapons is set up with an azimuth scale up to 3200 mils or only half of the circle. Consequently, the problem is to facilitate shifts in deflection greater than 3200 mils without sacrificing accuracy. Here is one system that has been devised to overcome this problem.

With the consideration of all-around fire of paramount importance, a free field of fire in all directions is prerequisite. An open field away from tree lines or any other obstacle which might create a high minimum elevation is desirable.



Figure 1. GUN POSITION (Airborne Artillery Battery of four guns)

Position Requirements: (1) Primary direction of fire assigned; battery laid Df 2800 mils. (2) Exec post and alternate exec post selected. (3) Minimum elevation not excessive throughout a 6400-mil sector.



Figure 2. FIRE COMMANDS

(1) It is assumed at the completion of each mission that the gunner refers to his initial aiming point at base Df. (2) The initial fire command must indicate the direction the tube must move to accommodate the announced Df.



Figure 3. FIRE CHART (reduced size)

(1) Prime deflection indices at 800-mil intervals. (2) Range deflection fan measures 500-mil intervals; add or subtract the necessary increment measured by the range Df fan from the prime Df index, depending on the position of the target.

Since airborne artillery units are equipped with only four guns, a diamond formation of the gun positions permits the flexibility and ease of control for all-around shooting. (*Figure 1.*) In laying the battery, the primary sector of fire, if any, is usually considered with alternate posts for the battery executive to occupy as the situation dictates.

The battery is laid in the normal manner. Once the battery is laid, however, the gunner on each piece affixes a plumb line to the panoramic sight and drives a stake into the ground directly below the sight as indicated by the plumb line. This stake marks a definite point on the ground where the sight and the aiming stakes are aligned. During firing then, the gun section keeps the sight directly over the stake and thereby minimizes lateral displacement in large direction shifts.

TO keep the sight directly over the stake, it will be necessary to keep both wheels unlocked when shifting trails. The gunner should supervise the trail shift so that he can control the speed with which the wheel closest to the sight is moved. This permits the sight to be kept as close to the pivot point of the axle as possible.

Once the sight stake is emplaced, the battery is laid to accommodate a 6400 mil field of fire. The sight only measures 3200 mils but by shifting trails and referring back to the same aiming stakes the additional 3200 mils can be accommodated.

Such a system necessitates a basic change in FDC procedure and fire commands; there are now two definite directions for each announced deflection. In order to eliminate any confusion it becomes necessary to affix to the command "Deflection" the direction the tube must move. For ex-

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LIEUTENANT EDWARD T. KLETT, JR., Artillery, wrote this article while assigned to the 82d Airborne Division. He now commands a battery in Korea.

ample: a battery is laid on base deflection 2800 mils and the announced deflection is "Deflection 200"; the shift can be either left or right in considering a 6400-mil sector. If it is desired that the tube move left past the 3200-mil line the command would be "Deflection *left* 200." (*Figure 2.*) Subsequent commands in the same fire mission do not require a direction indicator (left, right) as the direction of fire has already been established.

The fire chart presently employed with one deflection index indicating the base deflection and the 500-mil range deflection fan to determine the deflection command and the Gun-Target range are adequate but the technique or manner in which they are utilized will have to be altered slightly. In order to determine rapidly the correct deflection for a 6400-mil sector of fire it is necessary to augment the deflection index presently existing by placing a deflection index every 800 mils around the 6400-mil sector. For example, a deflection index is established at base deflection on Df 2800, one would then be established on 800 mils to the right and marked Df 2000, one would be established 800 mils to the left and marked Df 400. The range deflection fan would be used to measure the mil increment that properly describes the target to the right or left of these prime deflection indices and the increment would be either added or subtracted to the prime deflection depending on the position of the target.

Observers would employ the standard adjusting technique as prescribed by the target grid system with no change.

THIS system has been tested with both 75mm and 105mm howitzers and it proves to be most accurate. The maximum error incurred with the 75mm howitzer was three mils; the maximum error incurred with the 105mm howitzer was five mils. The critical point is when the piece is 1600 mils from the aiming stakes; such error approaches a maximum at the 1600-mil point and appears to vary proportionately with the deflection. A standard deflection "K" factor is applied for map data when using such a system.

This system masters the 6400-mil problem and enables artillery to render more efficient support over a wider section with a minimum loss of time.

Infantry dismount from the tank-accompanying personnel carrier and move to attack the enemy holding up the advance of the armor.

NEW ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER

The new T18E2 Armored Personnel Carrier is a squad-sized vehicle with a one-man crew—the driver. The armor provides protection from small-arms fire and shrapnel. The carrier was designed to accompany tanks and is powered with a six-cylinder Continental engine and has the Allison cross-drive transmission. On good roads it can make better than thirty-five miles per hour. It mounts a caliber .50 machine gun.

Pictures courtesy of *Armor* magazine

Side ports may be left open or semi-closed to give riflemen some protection.

Doughboys dismount through double doors in the rear.





VASILEVSKY
Minister of War

Dominated by the Army and traditionally attached to the methods of the pre-revolutionary Imperialist Army, the Soviet General Staff has many unexplained incongruities. But its performance should not be discounted.

THE early Soviet general staff, product of alternating French and German influence, retained the forms and doctrines of the staff system of the Tsars. As students of Russian military history have pointed out, the similarity between Imperial and Soviet staff organization and method was the direct result of the large number of former Imperial officers who took service in the revolutionary armies, thus constituting a link of continuity between the old and new order.

But the organization did not remain fixed. Soviet military organization and doctrine have gone through many changes. During World War II attention was given to providing a staff system that could handle huge forces in modern battle. As a result, the top-level Soviet staff is not the same as it was before World War II.

In 1946, the Soviet armed forces high command was reorganized to centralize control of the armed forces at the top. In a way this was statutory affirmation of what had happened during the war.

The wartime organization had consisted of a *stavka*, or Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of between thirty and forty key officers from both the Army (this included aviation) and the Navy. These officers performed *stavka* duties in addition to their regular assignments. Functioning as an advisory staff to the Supreme Commander, the *stavka* was charged with developing broad strategic plans. To help it, it had a small secretariat. Detailed operational planning stemming from the *stavka's* over-all plans was the responsibility of the Red Army General Staff.

Before this the Army General Staff had been subordinated to the People's Commissariat for Defense. Thus, one of the principal results of this change in status was that the General Staff was removed from the direct control of the Commissariat of Defense and was placed under the Supreme Commander and his *stavka*. The Red Army General Staff thus became responsible for the detailed preparation of *stavka* directives. This function required the Army General Staff to coordinate with other elements under the Commissariat of Defense, and to make necessary incidental decisions. All operational plans prepared by the Red Army General Staff were promulgated as orders of the Supreme Commander to the field commands for execution.

Although ostensibly subordinate to the *stavka*, the Red Army General Staff came very close to being a functional part of it. Because it prepared the *stavka's* plans, it necessarily exercised authority commensurate with such a mission. This authority elevated the Red Army General Staff to a position from which it dominated the other elements of the armed forces.

THE reorganization of 1946 made the Army General Staff the General Staff of the Armed Forces. This was accomplished with but minor changes in the former Red Army General Staff organization.

The new organization gave the Army indirect control of the armed forces. The Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff was an Army man, as were most of the members of that

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. D. HITTLE, USMC, is the author of *The Military Staff: Its History and Development*. This article is based on a chapter of that book, considerably revised and up-dated. The opinions expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Navy Department or Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

SHTEMENKO
Chief of the General Staff

SOKOLOVSKY
Deputy Minister of War

KONEV
Commander of Ground Forces

General Staff. While these officers do not have direct command over the various subordinate services, they are in a position to exercise a strong direct control over the Navy and Air Force.

So, whether intended or not, Soviet military development followed the German pattern. The Army dominates the nation's armed forces through the device of the single general staff.

During the war the Soviet's shortage of qualified top-level commanders and staff officers resulted in creation of a central pool of command and staff personnel. The immensity of the staff task can be realized from the fact that some twelve army groups were in position against the Germans at one time, with five or six of the groups actively committed.

This pool, called "the flying circus," provided command and staff teams which the *stavka* assigned to direct major operations. Such a team would often consist of from two to half a dozen high-ranking officers, usually headed by a marshal. This system of traveling command and staff teams was not limited to higher levels. At the command levels below those directly supervised by the flying circus, the system was referred to as "command liaison."

From the standpoint of Soviet doctrine, such "command liaison" probably seemed to be a reasonable solution. Soviet doctrine holds that a carefully planned, often rehearsed, and controlled operation offers greater chances of success than other types of operations The primary purpose of command liaison is to plan and direct the rupture and deep penetration of enemy lines, following which control is turned over to local commanders for exploitation.

UNTIL late in 1948, the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff was Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky. He had been a protégé of his predecessor, Marshal Shaposhnikov, who prevailed upon Stalin to appoint Vasilevsky, although he was well down the seniority list. A man of recognized brilliance, Vasilevsky, while Chief of the General Staff, was believed to have exercised a more powerful influence over the Soviet armed forces than did anyone, with the possible exception of Stalin himself.

Vasilevsky's personal ability and prestige went far toward strengthening the power of the Armed Forces General Staff. He was succeeded by another relatively junior general, Shtemenko.

Although much of our current information on the details of Soviet General Staff organization is hazy, the material that is available indicates that the Armed Forces General Staff now consists of seven divisions, or de-

The Soviet High Command



partments: Main Operations, Main Intelligence, Organization and Mobilization, Signal Communications, Fortified Areas (probably discontinued), Topographical, and Historical.

The Main Operations Division is the senior staff agency of the Armed Forces General Staff; its chief is deputy to the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff. Attached to the Main Operations Division are liaison officers from various arms and services and from ground, naval and air forces. Also, the Rear Services, since about 1939-40, has been represented by liaison personnel. The latter representation appears to have been established to improve the coordination of Red Army logistical and operational planning.

The Main Intelligence Division is reported to be an intelligence center for the armed forces, performing many of the functions which in the U.S. are the responsibilities of the three services.

The Organization and Mobilization Division is subdivided into two sections, one concerned with organization of the military forces, and the other with mobilization responsibilities.

The Signal Communications Division, generally analogous to the Reports and Liaison Sections of the old Imperial field army staffs, functions much as a high-level message center for the Armed Forces General Staff.

The Fortified Areas Division, responsible for the planning of military construction in fortified areas, is believed to have actual control over construction troops assigned to such projects. As previously noted, this division, historically one of the oldest in Russian general staff organization, has probably been eliminated.

The Topographical Division continues to perform much the same functions as it did under the old regime, being concerned principally with preparation and distribution of necessary military maps.

The Historical Division is more than an agency for accumulation of historical data. Actually it performs many research and analysis functions. Closely associated with the Voroshilov Academy of the General Staff, the Historical Division is able, through the recommendations contained in its reports, to exert a strong influence on the development of Soviet military doctrine. Such use of a general staff historical agency is noteworthy.

Currently, the Inspectorate of the Armed Forces General Staff is headed by Marshal Leonid Govorov, reportedly one of the most influential and capable of the Soviet marshals. The term "Inspector" as applied to Govorov's office carries the European rather than the American meaning. His responsibility pertains exclusively to inspecting the combat preparedness and efficiency of all combat and service units. An inspectorate system is extended downward through the principal field echelons. The inspectorate is directly responsible to the Minister of the Armed Forces, but in a technical sense is not part of the General Staff proper.

The Main Political Division of the Armed Forces is the Communist Party's agency for working in the military field. It is largely autonomous, receiving its directives from Party officials through independent channels of communication that go down to battalions. This separate communication system is used by the political officers, successors to the former commissars. This makes it obvious that the commissar system, regardless of the name by which it goes, has not been abolished or completely subordinated to military control. In another sense, the independent communication channel of the political officers bears more than a little resemblance to Ludendorff's independent "general staff" communication channels in World War I, a device that led to serious command complications.

ANOTHER agency whose status and powers are not too clearly defined in available information deals with counterintelligence. Known as *smersh* —a contraction of *smert' shpionam* ("death to spies") —it is not a part of the General Staff, nor is it coordinated by the intelligence division of that staff. Instead, *smersh* derives its authority directly from the Minister of State Security. In the execution of counterintelligence functions, it works closely with the Main Political Division, which explains why, at least on the lower levels, counterintelligence is so closely associated with the political officers. It is certainly difficult for U.S. officers trained in our staff doctrine to see any understandable method in the Soviet doctrine that provides for a separate officers' communication channel as well as the conduct of counterintelligence functions independently of the the intelligence division of the General Staff.

One point that should be noted with respect to the intelligence function in the Soviet Army is that the intelligence chief is charged with intelligence relating primarily to the enemy, and the political officer is responsible for what we call counterintelligence. This makes it easier to understand why the Red Army uses the term "reconnaissance" when referring to staff activities pertaining to enemy information.

As in the Imperial system, education of staff officers is controlled directly by the highest General Staff agency, currently the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff. Coming under his supervision are the principal staff schools of the Soviet forces: the Frunze Academy, a three-year course on a level generally comparable to our Command and General Staff College; and the Voroshilov General Staff Academy, also a three-year course, on a similar level to our National War College.

IN a legal, or perhaps theoretical sense, the three arms — naval, land and air—are co-equal. But in reality this isn't so. The intrenched position of the former Red Army Staff, the abundance of Soviet manpower, the fact that the Soviet is a land-power nation, all add up to important reasons why, in spite of charts and theory, the ground forces dominate the naval and air elements of the armed forces.

The chart on page 37 shows the organization of the Soviet armed forces. The belief that the long-range air command and home air-defense force are directly responsible to the Ministry of the Armed Forces raises a question as to the practical relationship of these two agencies to other major elements of the Armed Forces. It is conjectural as to whether they are in fact even partially autonomous, for current Soviet doctrine considers aviation essentially as a supporting arm, although this may be undergoing some modification in view of recent reports of Russian strategic air developments.

Infantry, the basic arm of the Soviet Armed Forces, comes under no specific chief. The Commander in Chief of Ground Forces functions largely as the chief of infantry, and has under him a "Main Staff" consisting of five sections: operations, intelligence, signal, organization, and combat training. Emphasizing the infantry aspect of the ground command, this Main Staff is charged with the responsibility of evolving basic infantry tactics and doctrine. Curiously, in addi-

tion to the infantry, the only other combat arm under the control of the Commander in Chief of Ground Forces is the cavalry. Internal administration of the cavalry is exercised by the chief of that branch, Marshal Semyon Budyenny. However, the Main Staff is vested with a limited coordinating authority over the ground-force arms and services that may come under the control of the Ministry.

The position of the Commander in Chief of Ground Forces is somewhat anomalous in view of the fact that his influence over the principal ground force elements has been shared, to some extent, with the ministry.

Commanders in chief of the ground forces arms and services are responsible for the development of doctrine for their own arms as well as for the training of their personnel. Also, they have a specialized supply responsibility insofar as their respective arms are concerned.

Basic ground-force schools come under the direction of the ground-force commander. This educational system, while only part of the much larger armed forces schooling structure, includes officer candidate schools; the Suvorov Schools, similar in many respects to the Imperial Army cadet schools; and the various intermediate ground-force schools.

Agencies whose activities relate equally to all of the various arms and services come under the Ministry. These include the Main Personnel Administration; Main Administration for Formation and Equipment of Troops; Main Administration of Hydrometeorological Services; and Main Administration of Military Tribunals.

CLOSELY similar to the system of the Imperial Army, the rear services are largely independent of the Armed Forces General Staff, as well as in this instance, the Ground Forces Main Staff. The Chief of the Rear Services, although functioning essentially as a coordinator, is on the same level as the Commanders in Chief of the Ground, Air, and Naval Forces. Under his direction are subordinate agencies concerned with general supply, rations and fodder, medical and veterinary, finance, fuels and lubricants, rail transportation, and so on. His logistic powers are exceedingly broad, extending to the direct procurement, transportation, and issue of supplies. In addition, his organization acts as a coordinating agency for clearance of requisitions for the specialized supplies required by the arms and services.

As previously noted, coordination between Rear Services and the Armed Forces General Staff is effected by the presence of a small Rear Services liaison team in the Operations Division. This arrangement may rectify some of the former difficulties resulting from separation of logistical and operational planning agencies; it still appears, at least in terms of U. S. staff doctrine, to be a partial solution, as the logistical planning function still remains in the Rear Services, largely independent of the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff.

In view of the differences between U. S. and Soviet staff logistic agencies, it might be well to consider a few general factors of strength in the Soviet

Future generals and staff officers stand at attention during an inspection at the Leningrad Infantry School



military supply system. With the possible exception of ammunition and weapons, supply of the Soviet Army is not systematized to the degree it is in western European and United States armies. While it would be wrong to visualize the Russian soldier as an outdoor superman capable of thriving on bark and melted snow, it must be remembered that traditionally the Russian soldier has been noted for his ability to get along on meager regular issues of food and even thrive when living off the country. This national characteristic has been recognized and exploited by Soviet Army leaders. However, regardless of the comparable efficiency of Soviet and Western logistic agencies, Soviet Army supply was measurably superior to that of the Imperial Army in the Russo-Japanese War and the first World War.

In contrast with Imperial military policy, there is apparently no separate permanent General Staff Corps in the Red Army. Such a conclusion is drawn from an examination of available files of *Vedomosti* (Law Gazette), which would contain reference to such a General Staff Corps if one existed. This conclusion is further substantiated by Major General John R. Deane, Chief of the U. S. Military Mission to Moscow in 1943-45, who has stated: "It is my recollection that the staff of these various commanders [front, army, corps and division] were not general staff officers in the sense that they belonged to a General Staff Corps." By rejecting the idea of a separate General Staff Corps to which officers would be permanently appointed, the Soviet Army has in this respect improved on the Imperial system that provided for a permanent staff corps.

Although there is good reason to believe that no permanent staff corps exists in the Soviet Army, officers assigned to general staff duties enjoy a prestige beyond that normally commensurate with their rank. As an example of the unusual authority vested in a Soviet Army general staff officer, General Deane tells of an occasion when he was a member of a committee that included a Soviet air marshal, an admiral, and a general staff major general. "The general staff official," General Deane related, "was designated as chairman almost as a matter of right."

AT the level generally corresponding to our Department of the Army General Staff, the Soviet Army General Staff possesses great power. Such authority as the Red Army General Staff enjoyed during World War II derived more from its position and prestige than from numerical strength, which was considerably smaller than might be expected. It was housed in a building having about the same floor space, according to General Deane, "as a medium sized high school building in the United States."

To those schooled in U. S. staff organization and doctrine the Soviet staff system appears to possess many incongruities. But regardless of how we may be inclined to evaluate it in comparison with our staff system, we must recognize that the staff system of the Soviet Communist armies proved, in final analysis, to be adequate to the task confronting it in World War II. There is no reason to believe that Soviet staff thought and functioning cannot be further improved by widespread and aggressive military education of the officers of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Students at the Dzerzhinsky Artillery Academy engaged in a study of observation methods. This is an undated photograph, probably of pre-World War II origin

MOS BRIEFING OFFICER

Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Wright, Jr., and Major Lauren E. McBride

Tips on a job you may get some day

THERE is no military occupation specialty number for a briefing officer but high commanders and staffs are using them more and more. So any staff officer who knows the ins and outs of a given situation or subject is likely to find himself a briefing officer—a man expected to "tell all," lucidly and concisely.

This briefing is not the same as the standard estimate of the situation, found in Appendix 1 of Field Manual 101-5. It has little to do with capabilities, conclusions, and recommendations for a commander to base his decision upon. Briefing is simply a method of bringing commanders and staffs up to the minute on any situation including its economic, sociological, or psychological factors.

A briefing may cover a day, a week, a month, or any other period. And it can take a minute, five minutes, or an hour to give. The period covered and the kind of audience determine the length.

This is not an attempt to change or improve upon Technical Manual 21-250, *Methods of Instruction*. For information on training aids, stage poise, mannerisms, and so on, TM 21-250 is the last official word. But if you are a potential briefer and want a proved, workable way of making an effective presentation, the outline below will help you. It will help you achieve the unity, coherence, and brevity your performance requires.

(1) THE WEATHER REPORT. This part should be more than a mere description. It should include some tangible result of the weather; for example, "poor visibility" might result in "minimum air sorties being flown" . . . "heavy fog" may "hamper ground operations.". . . "rains and thawing ground" may "cause logistical support operations to be slowed up by muddy roads." If your briefing covers air, ground, and sea operations and the weather affects them, tell the whole story—but briefly.

(2) GENERAL STATEMENT OF TACTICAL ACTION. Take a tip from the newspapers and headline your most important events in a one-sentence summary of the general situation. Use a set pattern of procedure in doing this so that your audience is not only with you but anticipates your procedure and easily follows you. We read from left to right across the page. So, when possible, carry your audience with the tip of your pointer across the map from left to right.

(3) DETAILED RESUME OF TACTICAL ACTION. The amount of detail you use depends on your audience. You would not cover each minor action or event in detail for a general staff audience at Department of Army, theater, or comparable level. Operational staffs must anticipate every requirement of smaller tactical units and need considerably more detail of the combat action. And they need as many details on planned future operations as their responsibilities require them to know. The level of the audience usually is known to the briefer. If it isn't, he should find out what is expected of him.

(4) ENEMY REAR AREAS. There are two aspects of this:

Close: Here you briefly discuss such items as enemy combat strengths in contact, those capable of immediate intervention, unit identifications, artillery and armor support, and other factors directly affecting the tactical situation. In short, you give the enemy tactical order of battle.

Deep: This is the heading under which a collection of relevant intelligence subjects can be presented, if they are within the scope of your briefing. Strategic order of battle (corps and army level), enemy logistical activity, law and order in occupied areas, friendly guerrilla effort, and so on. Select the matters that have the most direct effect on the main theme, but always be prepared to answer questions on any related subject within the scope of the briefing.

(5) FRIENDLY REAR AREAS. Here, too, you can break your presentation up into two parts. The activities of either friendly or hostile forces or both should be described. A rule of thumb is to cover strictly military items first, such as strength and location of friendly reserves, and actions of by-passed enemy or guerrilla forces. Then, if applicable, select those economic, political, or sociological items of greatest significance. Handling and disposition of prisoners of war would come under this heading.

Clothes Maketh Man

Now that our country is about to acquire a standing army that may run well over a million, can't we hope that regulations compelling the wearing of the uniform at all times won't be resurrected? During the recent war the uniform was worn not only while on duty but also when we were on leave, furlough or pass.

This custom of wearing the uniform around the clock was not the case in all the armies engaged in World War II. A pair of the leading contenders, the militaristic Germans and antimilitaristic British, permitted the wearing of civilian clothing in the home country when the soldier was not on duty—in fact, they encouraged the practice. Moreover, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army during that conflict once permitted a national picture magazine to run his photograph showing him on his home place dressed in civilian lounging attire—he looked not only well dressed but comfortable and relaxed.

There are a number of good reasons against 24-hour-a-day wearing of the uniform, even during a war, in the home country. For one thing it lets the man in the service get away a short time from the feeling of constraint and being in the public eye that the uniform imposes. It would give an additional fillip to the morale from being off-duty.

Not that the U. S. Army uniform isn't a thing of dignity which points out the wearer as a man selected—(and if anyone reads humor into that word "selected" he can read it right out again). The man who takes pride in his uniform and likes to wear it to show the home folk that he is really a soldier will do so anyway, and be the happier for it.

A case could also be made to permit wearing civilian clothing in the occupied lands where no shooting is going on for the time being. If this had been so, the press would perhaps not have served up the story of the recent brawl in Paris where several soldiers exhibited most of the antics that drunks could exhibit. If those young men had been in civilian clothing they might have been mistaken for mere American tourists.

In the field of the national economy (I almost said "overall" field, but thought better of it) wearing civilian clothes off duty would save money, anyway. There would be millions of man-days eliminated in wear and tear on the uniform—enough to make the quartermaster happy, as well as the tax-payer, who at the moment is even unhappier than the QM.

COL. JOHN R. ULMER
Infantry, Retired

Yo-Yo War

ONE soldier here called this war a yo-yo war. Up and down we go. We attack madly for a while, then, bingo! —the same old picture develops and south we go. Then back again. Most of us can see no end to it. The Chinese would certainly run wild if they succeeded in winning this exercise. But they can't quit because of the loss of face. It appears to me an aggressive stalemate bounded by the Korean peninsula. It is unique in that the supply source of neither adversary can be touched by the other. If we do drive to the Yalu River we couldn't hold that line without prohibitive increases in UN (US) forces.

Many lessons in warfare against massed manpower have come out of this fracas, but there are still many that have not gotten to the right place.

Night attacks have been the rule so far as the enemy is concerned. The answer to this is night aviation. On one occasion we had an air force flare ship over the RCT perimeter while an enemy night attack was under way. The pilot happened to be an ex-artilleryman who knew how to adjust mortar and artillery fire on the enemy guns and riflemen by observing flashes and he really saved the day. The enemy couldn't fire without being seen. Our liaison pilots must know night flying and planes must be equipped for it. Landing strips can be adequately lighted by jeeps.

Our training centers must provide a steady flow of well trained men. "Well trained" is all-inclusive. Our present Stateside training must be tougher. Commanders must accept the fact that there will be occasional casualties in good tough training. It will save many casualties later. "Safety" has been one of our worst enemies.

Commanders must avoid launching offensives of the "spearhead" type without very large reserves. The enemy cuts the road behind such a spearhead, and the natural reaction is to high-tail it home. We have lost heavily in men, and tremendous amounts of equipment on three such attempts. These units must button up, get supplies by air, and hang on until the reserves can break through. We have never had the reserve.

Each infantry division needs one light plane specifically designed for air resupply. We have used conventional liaison planes for this purpose almost constantly, but to resupply a company for one day takes many trips. A plane with a cargo compartment that could be released by the pilot so that the cargo falls through the bottom of the plane will do the trick.

Range should be the predominant consideration in developing new small arms. It is heart-breaking to see the dust kick up several hundred yards short of a clearly visible and unconcerned enemy. Our small arms are good, but I do feel that we sometimes stress rates of fire over range.

The Chinese have helped to teach us the value of our own power telescope. They captured twenty of them somewhere, and gave one RCT hell at 1,000 yards. They had the scopes mounted on M1 rifles.

Our tactical air arm should spend a few months with the Marines. The Marine pilots give us the feeling that they are breaking their hearts to help us and are as much in this show as we are. Air Force fighters seem to just drop in because there was no place else to go.

CAPTAIN
Infantry

Conservation

The biggest waste of manpower in the Army, as in the Government generally, is in handling unnecessary paper work. And the volume of it constantly increases. More high-ranking officers should be given the job of cutting down the paper-shuffling waste motion in every possible way.

For a start, here are some things to tackle:

(1) Drastically reduce all distribution lists so that each installation gets only the stuff that applies to it. Savings: tons of paper and untold hours of useless posting and filing.

(2) Require the personal check and approval of the commanding officer of every headquarters on every new or additional reports from subordinate units. Savings: a vast number of man-hours more.

(3) Have all echelons of command survey present reports to see which could be simplified or thrown out. Savings: still more wasted man-hours.

(4) Substitute individual officers for boards wherever possible (about ninety per cent of the time.) Cut out all NCO promotion and reduction boards. Make all promotions and reductions on the recommendation of the unit commander with approval of the regimental or similar level commander. No one to bother anybody else. But if any man thinks he has been unjustly treated he should still have the usual right of appeal to the inspector general. Savings: officer man-hours at every post and unit.

(5) Head off the new system of courts-martial before it ever starts. Line officers have shown they are fully capable of protecting the rights of persons tried and those of the Government. Turning the business over to lawyers will certainly complicate and slow down the whole procedure, delay the administration of justice and add to the paper work all the way down the line.

(6) Drastically simplify the procedure for eliminating undesirable men, both officer and enlisted.

These changes would probably make it possible to do away with the unit administrator who was recently added to the T/O of most company-sized units to cope with their growing paper-work load. They would make unnecessary the commissioning of many high priced lawyers to handle the new legal set-up.

The "anti-paper-work" people would undoubtedly come up with many other savings. The main thing needed is impetus from the top to reverse the present trend. If it's allowed to continue unchecked, half the Army will be busy filling out forms and grinding out reports.

COL. GASTON EIKEL
Infantry

YOU AND YOUR ARMY

(*Continued from page* 12)

amounts of artillery ammunition far forward and eliminate the jobs of many men who are now engaged in bringing ammunition up to the guns. He also says "it is quite possible to develop a conveyor that will load directly into an antiaircraft gun or a howitzer from an individual storage dump."

He believes that a conveyor system could be camouflaged much easier than a truck route and thus would be less likely to be hit by air attack.

He says that conveyors are easier to manufacture, ship and maintain than trucks and that they have lower operating cost and the "initial cost of two hundred feet of belt conveyor is about $3,500, roughly the same as a 2½-ton truck." At that rate thirty miles of conveyor would cost two and three-quarter million dollars, not including the cost of the mobile units which furnish the power.

Some of Mr. Von Thaden's figures seem to have some bugs in them—and that, of course, is what the Transportation Corps' Research and Development Board is studying, along with all other aspects of the problem. For example, let's go back to the four hundred trucks it would take to do the work of one 30-inch conveyor thirty miles long. Mr. Von Thaden said that his conveyor would carry five tons of supply every minute. That would add up to 300 tons an hour or 7,200 tons in twenty-four hours. Now the 400 trucks, each carrying five tons —that's his figure—would have to make slightly more than three trips each twenty-four-hour period to carry the same tonnage. That does not seem excessive when we remember that Mr. Von Thaden has assigned three drivers to each truck to keep it in nearly continuous operation. Say the thirty-mile conveyor distance stretched out to forty-five miles by road. A driver ought to make that in two and one-half hours. That's five hours for a round trip. An hour for unloading at each end would make seven hours. Three trips would total twenty-one hours. That jibes pretty well with Mr. Von Thaden's unexplained estimate. But the whole thing is pretty much a guess, of course.

When it comes to costs Mr. Von Thaden says that 200 feet of 30-inch conveyor costs about $3,500. That's $17.50 per foot and thirty miles (158,400 feet) would cost $2,772,000, if our multiplication is correct. That doesn't include the cost of the mobile units required to give the conveyor its power. Mr. Von Thaden said that one of these is required every 1,500 to 2,000 feet. That would be about three per mile or ninety for a 30-mile conveyor. He doesn't tell us what these would cost. But the 400 trucks the conveyor would replace would cost, he says, about $3,500 each or $1,400,000. However, Mr. Von Thaden says that the life expectancy of a conveyor is five to fifteen times that of a truck.

All of this suggests a little of the nature of the study of Colonel Meyer and his co-workers. They are making a thorough study of all aspects of the system, including feasibility and costs.

"Each step in the study and development of an item such as a conveyor is subjected to a hyper-critical examination and evaluation as to feasibility, cost and potential value by military boards, committees and civilian consultants," he reminds us. "The end item proposed must show unquestionable savings in dollars, manpower or material, and only when such can be shown are we permitted to expend funds for pilot or experimental models.

"It is the considered opinion of a number of outstanding technicians in this particular field that there are numerous possibilities for the military adaptation of the conveyor. The primary objection . . . lies in the field of maintenance, which we do not consider, at present, as an insurmountable problem, but rather one to be solved hand-in-hand with the development of other military characteristics."

Until all the information is in and the studies and analyses are concluded, Colonel Meyer naturally won't forecast the outcome of the study. So don't expect to have a conveyor system terminate at the door of your CP for at least a year or so.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY SURVEY

World Perimeters

Colonel Conrad H. Lanza

20 April to 20 May 1951

GERMANY

GERMANY'S eastern and western boundaries are approximately the same as they were a thousand years ago. About the year 1000 the Poles advanced and secured the line of the Elbe. Then Germany advanced eastwardly at a slow but steady rate. In 1255 she had secured Koenigsberg and what became known as East Prussia; in 1290 Breslau and Silesia were taken. Up to 1945 these cities and provinces were German.

Germany spread western civilization and Christianity to Poland and the Baltic nations. It kept the Slavs out of the west and resisted French moves to the Coast. German troops stopped the great Mongol invasion in 1246. During the next seven centuries Germany has been invaded by Slavs from the east, Swedes from the north, and French from the west. Russians reached Berlin nearly two hundred years ago, and in 1815 crossed Germany and entered Paris. French troops have previously captured Berlin and in 1812 crossed Germany to reach Moscow. That these invasions ultimately failed was largely because of German resistance to them.

For ten centuries Germany has been the buffer between Slavs on the east, and French and their allies on the west. It has protected each against the other by absorbing their shocks. Now, for the first time in history, Germany is impotent and no longer able to fill that role. East and West no longer have an intermediate buffer state.

This situation has caused both East and West to fear an attack by the other. And to re-create the ancient German buffer state is the ardent desire of both sides—provided Germany joins them.

East Germany earlier this year made overtures to West Germany. Every German desires to see his country united and the negotiations were represented as being between one German and another. It is improbable that East Germany would have made any proposal without the Soviet Union's authorization. It is even likely that Moscow ordered it. In substance the proposal suggested that all Germany become a communist state. Between communists, there are no boundaries and no wars, for all follow a uniform law, and allegedly uniform happiness.

Germans are intelligent. They have had ample opportunity to observe communism in East Germany, in Russia and among the satellites. Communism does bring uniformity—uniformity to Moscow's rule, and the abolition of local habits, customs and religions for which Soviet law, culture and religion is substituted. It means police rule. The removal of large numbers of people to Siberia and other distant regions and their replacement by Asiatics in an endeavor to create a new race loyal to Soviet communism.

Communism does not appeal to Germans. German culture is oriented toward the West. The highly developed German civilization is similar to that of other Western nations. The proposal of east Germany was not favorably received.

The West, represented by the NATO, fears that if Germany should align itself with the Slavs, Western Europe would become a beachhead for the NATO. It would be difficult to defend and could not be defended at all, unless powerful forces were constantly maintained against a sudden attack. To keep Germany from falling into the Soviet orbit, and if possible to secure German cooperation the NATO is ready to make certain concessions.

What do the Germans want? They want much, but they are realistic and realize the limitations. If allowed to vote freely, there is no doubt that the returns would overwhelmingly favor the reuniting of the present separated regions, to include Austria. Austria's 1918 constitution declared that it was a German state. The years between World Wars I and II proved that Austria alone is too small a state to be viable. The method used by Hitler to annex Austria was disliked, but the annexation itself was unopposed, and the Austrians during World War II fought loyally under the German banner. The Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943, inviting Austria to turn against the Germans, fell on deaf ears.

Germany desires complete independence. If she can reunite her nationals under a single flag, she is ready to resume her old position as the buffer between the East and the West.

The importance to the East and the West of the German decision is understood by Germans. It would be foolish to believe that her statesmen will fail to take advantage of the opportunity and bargain for maximum benefits.

In view of the situation, the Occupying Powers of West Germany and the Government of West Germany, appointed a Board of seven Allied and four German members, which convened at Petersberg (adjacent to Bonn) on 10 May. Its duties are to draft an agreement in lieu of a peace treaty, which is impracticable at this time. The agreement is to provide for the complete independence of West Germany with the sole restriction that the NATO shall have the right to maintain half a million troops within Germany to oppose a possible attack from the East. How much of this force will be German will have to be determined. The Agreement is not to cover the question of boundaries. That is to be left for later negotiation, and will depend upon the outcome of the Cold War.

CHINA

HIGH officials in Washington have expressed the hope that the heavy losses of the Chinese in Korea would result in a demand for peace. It was

hinted that it might not be long before this occurred.

Chinese broadcasts are regularly heard and monitored in this country. The South China press is regularly received in Hong Kong, and carries a full line of despatches of the Chinese News Services. Neither press nor broadcasts have given any intimation of a desire for peace. On the contrary they have constantly and urgently asked for continued and vigorous prosecution of the war. On 15 May the Peiping radio called for further efforts "until the outrageous and shameless American imperialists are completely driven out of Korea."

The United States emphasizes the war in Korea as a *United Nations* effort in which the Americans are but one out of many. China never mentions the *United Nations* or any of the components of the U.N. other than the Americans, who are always described as being responsible for the war. The Chinese are continually told that they are fighting the *United States*. No mention of peace has appeared.

What chance of peace is there? The Chinese are a patient race. They will suffer more misrule and disasters than any Western nation would ever put up with. Battle losses, destructive floods, and epidemics have been passively accepted for thousands of years. All are considered as natural calamities. Loss of a few hundred thousands of men in Korea means little to a China which sees tens of millions die from other causes every year. The Chinese are also an indifferent race. They do not worry over other people's troubles. The government is not concerned about how many people are killed in a war. Red China can well keep going on the path it has selected, perfectly willing to take as long as necessary to accomplish its aims.

The present government in Peiping is headed by the men who have led the Chinese Communist Party for twenty-five years. They have suffered much in those years, and have seen some frightful slaughters of their followers in previous campaigns. In the long wars against Japan, neither the Communists nor the Kuomintang ever sought peace terms. They endured terrific losses, coupled with occupation of much of their territory. Patience led them to continue as well as they could, confident that if they persevered, something would eventually turn up in their favor.

Why therefore, yield in Korea where the war has existed for less than a year?

The outlook for a peace proposal from China at this time would be contrary to Chinese characteristics. With patience they will continue the way they started on, and with indifference they will disregard losses in the field. If there be any change in this line it will be due to some other reason.

THE NEAR EAST

Levant. Minor hostilities have occurred since 1 May along the frontier between Israel and Syria, which later spread to the Jordan frontier. The United Nations maintains a military observation force supposed to watch the frontiers and preserve peace. Nobody seems to have paid much attention to their orders to cease fire.

On 15 May the representatives of the Arab League convened at Damascus. No peace has ever been made between Israel and the Arab states, and one of the first acts of the Arabs was to announce that they would not consider a peace treaty of Israel. The Arabs fear Israel. They feel that the rapidly expanding population of Israel will force an Israeli effort to expand its present boundaries at the expense of the surrounding Arab states.

The Arabs have few military resources, and cannot fight long, unless they are sponsored by some power, who will finance them and furnish munitions and arms. Israel has for the moment the financial ability to

buy arms and supplies, and has to date received what she needed.

Among all members of the United Nations voting for an embargo against China, the Asiatic members including the Arab League were against it. Not because they favored Chinese aggression in Korea, but because they disliked the Americans. In case of a Russian advance toward the Suez Canal this hostile feeling may have important consequences.

Iran. Iran is going ahead with the confiscation of the great oil works at Abadan. This large and modern oil plant largely supplies the needs of West Europe. The Iran law for seizure does provide for compensation but does not provide means for payment. Essence of the dispute which has arisen between Iran and Great Britain, which owns the majority of shares of the Anglo-Iran Company, is that the latter was granted a concession in 1943, good for fifty years. The agreement contained a clause which reads that "it should never be altered by action of Iran, or even by the Iran legislature, except as the result of a [new] agreement." The agreement calls for arbitration of disputes. Iran has refused to negotiate a new agreement, and also arbitration. It set 30 May as a dead line for surrendering the property. Great Britain protested and warned that grave consequences may result from Iran's plain violation of its obligations.

This dispute is due to a difference in law and principles between East and West. They are not in accord.

Eastern nations believe that no contract is valid, regardless of any clause that states it will continue for a specified time, unless the conditions existing at time it was signed remain unchanged. In Iran, since 1943 when the oil agreement was signed, the change has been from an occupied state in a war with Russia, to an independent state. This change is considered ample justification for denouncing the oil agreement.

British and Iranian arguments are based on different principles which have no relation to each other. East and West are not alike.

NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

THE Council has been reorganized and consolidated with numerous boards studying finance, supplies, defense, etc. Composed theoretically of the Defense Ministers it is now provided that any Minister or his Deputy may represent his country. The U.S. Deputy is Mr. Charles Spofford. The Council sits permanently in London as the top Allied planning unit. Under it will function the Military Council already organized and stationed in Washington; and a Finance and Economic Board which is to be established in Paris.

Iceland is a full member of the NATO, but it has no military forces.

Its government requested that the United States undertake to defend the island. The United States has agreed to do this. On 7 May a small infantry force landed and proceeded to cover the important air base at Keflavik, about thirty miles east of Reykjavik.

Mediterranean. No commander for this important area has yet been appointed. One plan was to set up an East Mediterranean command under a British officer. This would be charged with opposing a hostile advance by ground and/or air toward the Suez Canal; defend Turkey and Greece; aid Yugoslavia, and oppose a hostile advance overland into North Italy. All very important missions and all of which might occur simultaneously.

To strengthen this area, the United States on 15 May formally proposed that Turkey and Greece become members of the NATO. Great Britain and France have in the past opposed this proposition, but the serious situations in the Near East have caused them to agree to reconsider it. If they agree it is believed that the other nine Allies will also agree. Reasons for objections have included a fear that it will result in an increase of liabilities rather than assets; that the American military aid program will have to be divided among a greater number of Allies, resulting in the present ones receiving less; and that a precedent would be established and lead the way to other applications for membership. This means Spain which is disliked by both England and France.

France might not object to a British commander of the East Mediterranean sector, provided a West Mediterranean sector was also set up, with a French commander. Main mission would be to guard the lines of communication from south France to French North Africa.

Although there is no commander in the Mediterranean, the defense forces of the NATO in that area have a complete war plan.

Last month we reported that Portugal could furnish one division to the anti-communist defense forces. Portugal has now made it known, that if Spain is admitted to the NATO she will contribute six divisions to join Spain's twenty to defend the Pyrenees. Whether these divisions could be used north of the Pyrenees has not been determined.

ARTILLERY

New GFT

The Department of Gunnery of The Artillery School is producing a new graphical firing table (GFT) for the 105mm howitzer. This GFT is based on the tabular firing table 105-H-4 (dual granulation propellant) and give fuze-setting data for the M500 mechanical-time and superquick fuze. Dual granulation ammunition with M500 MTSQ fuzes will eventually replace the present type of ammunition.

Radio Chart

The Department of Communications has announced the publication of a chart showing the military characteristics of the new family of frequency modulated (FM) radios. This will serve as a ready guide to the identification of tactical sets in the standardized series.

The chart includes a frequency spectrum showing the frequency ranges of operation of the various FM radios. There are also photographs of the basic field artillery radio sets, AN/GRC-5, AN/PRC-6, and AN/PRC-9.

The publication will be available through the Book Department, TAS, as an insert to package C-7.

Air Wire Laying

A new Training Circular entitled "Wire Laying by Army Aircraft" recently was completed by the Division of Training Publications and Aids and forwarded to OCAFF for approval. It includes the methods and techniques of laying wire over difficult terrain from high-speed dispensers attached to both airplanes and helicopters.

It describes also the use of a canvas container which holds 4 MX-306-A/G wire dispensers and includes patterns so that units in the field may make their own. This TC should be printed and ready for distribution in about three months.

3500th Student

The Department of General Subjects graduated its 3500th student in the Technique of Instruction course in May. The course is designed especially for new members of the faculty of the School. The May class was the 140th to complete the course.

Fire Demonstrations

The frequent use of direct-fire methods in Korea has added increased interest in the direct-fire and assault-fire demonstrations which are presented to the students at The Artillery School. The demonstration includes taking realistic moving targets under fire with live ammunition and depicts the use of artillery pieces in the close-in defense of battery positions. The effects of various fuze and shell combinations, when fired at extremely close ranges, are demonstrated.

In the assault-fire phase of the demonstration, students see heavy artillery attack pin-point targets at close range. A tactical situation is then developed which requires the use of assault-fire techniques.

Survey Forms

The following forms for survey computations, and recording of data for targets located by field artillery observation battalions, have been approved by the Department of the Army, and given AGO numbers:

DA AGO Form 6-1, Azimuth and Distance from Coordinates
DA AGO Form 6-2, Coordinates from Azimuth and Distance
DA AGO Form 6-3a, Orienting Data for Flash Ranging Observation Posts
DA AGO Form 6-3b, Flash Ranging Records
DA AGO Form 6-3c, Short Base Flash Ranging Record
DA AGO Form 6-4, Sound Plotting Record
DA AGO Form 6-5, Survey Locations
DA AGO Form 6-6, Record of Sound, Flash, and Radar Ranging Location
DA AGO Form 6-8, Triangulation
DA AGO Form 6-10, Hour Angle Azimuth Determination
DA AGO Form 6-11, Altitude Azimuth Determination

These forms may be requisitioned through regular publication channels.

Forms for computation of 2-point and 3-point resection surveys have been approved and will be given AGO numbers by the Adjutant General in the near future.

Marine Courses

The Marine Corps Schools is now using in its instruction program the following gunnery subcourses of The Artillery School: 20-6, "Basic Artillery Gunnery;" 20-10FA, "Conduct of Observed Fire;" 30-12FA, "Fire Direction Center Technique;" and 30-13FA, "Unobserved Fire."

Extension Courses

Unit Programs. The Department of Extension Courses has prepared a series of recommended programs for use of unit commanders in training key officers and noncommissioned officers. The programs recommend a series of sub-courses suitable for study by individuals holding down T/O&E jobs. Each officer and cadre NCO can receive valuable training in his specific job by enrolling in the subcourses listed after his job assignment.

The series includes all units of the infantry and armored divjsions artillery.

Interested organization commanders, and/or prospective enrollees in extension courses, may obtain a list of those subcourses pertinent to their type unit by writing to the Director, Department of Extension Courses, The Artillery School, Fort Sill 10, Oklahoma.

Gunnery Series. Interest in the Special Field Artillery Gunnery series has increased steadily since the beginning of the war in Korea. This is particularly true of reserve officers not on active duty—but subject to recall.

INFANTRY

Airborne Demonstrations

In recent demonstrations at The Infantry School, a rocket launcher team parachuted from a C-82 transport and was in position and firing three minutes and eight seconds after landing. Each of the three-man crew carried a share of the load in a bag which he lowered on a length of webbing just before hitting the ground.

In another demonstration a 105mm recoilless rifle and its jeep carrier were dropped from a C-119. The gun crew parachuted with it and promptly went into action. To show that two 105s and carriers can be carried in one C-119, a second jeep was dropped from the same airplane.

Following the demonstrations, Major General William M. Miley, Commandant of the Airborne Center, discussed air transportability with the Associate Advanced Classes. To attain true mobility through air transportation it is essential to have lighter equipment, better aircraft and make wider use of air lines of communication, he said.

Tactical Units

The Infantry School is becoming accustomed to the arrival and departure of tactical units that train at Benning. The 3d Infantry Division left last summer and has been in Korea since early fall. The 4th Infantry Division came to Benning when it was designated a tactical division and it has now pulled out for Europe.

The 30th Infantry Regiment—a part of the 3d Division during two world wars—has been reactivated at Benning and will be part of the Infantry Center's Combat Training Command.

REUNIONS

The information listed in the following paragraphs was furnished by officers of the various associations.

2d Infantry Division. Philadelphia, Pa. 26-28 July. For details: National Headquarters Second Division Assn., 116 N. Third St., Camden 2, N. J.

3d Armored Division. Deshler-Wallick Hotel, Columbus, Ohio. 26-28 July. For details: Secretary-Treasurer, 80 Federal St., Boston 10, Mass.

8th Armored Division. Congress Hotel, Chicago, Ill. 29 June-1 July. For details: Daniel M. Garside, Secretary, Suite 1008, 33 N. LaSalle St., Chicago 2, Ill.

9th Infantry Division. Hotel Commodore, New York City. 27-28 July. For details: National Secretary, P.O. Box 1704, Washington 13, D. C.

25th Infantry Division. Hotel Statler, Washington. 6-8 July. For details: Secretary, P.O. Box 101, Arlington, Va.

30th Infantry Division. Cleveland, Ohio. 4-6 July. For details: Charles E. Campbell, 65 E. 91st St., New York 28, N. Y.

41st Infantry Division. Ben Franklin Hotel, Seattle, Wash. 15-17 July. For details: Edward L. Barrow, Portland Municipal Airport, Portland 13, Ore.

100th Infantry Division. Hotel Benjamin Franklin, Philadelphia. 7-9 September. For details: The Century Assn., P.O. Box 86, Hartford, Conn.

Manuals

The postwar phase of The Infantry School's training publications program, begun in 1947, is nearing an end. By the end of fiscal 1952, the School will have written or revised 35 field and technical manuals.

FM 60-5 "Amphibious Operations, Battalion in Assault Landing" was published in February. It was the twenty-second manual printed and distributed since the program began. Of the 13 remaining manuals, four are now being printed, two have been forwarded for review, and the remaining six are in the works.

Canadians

The Canadian Army has sent an infantry team to The Infantry School to demonstrate Canadian weapons. Half of the team will spend six weeks at the School and the other half 12 weeks. While at the Center the team will work with the Research and Analysis Section of The School and Army Field Forces Board No. 3. Eventual objective is the standardization of U.S. and Canadian weapons.

ORC Subject Schedules

More writers and editors have been assigned to turning out ORC subject schedules to speed up the master ORC training program, prescribed by Army Field Forces. These schedules break allotted training time down into lesson hours. They contain a lesson plan which gives the scope, text references, training aids, facilities required and equipment needed to teach ORC students each subject. When concluded 140 subject schedules will have been prepared and distributed to ORC units down to companies.

Expert Infantryman Badge

A board of officers assigned from the Academic Department of The Infantry School has recommended to Army Field Forces that requirements for the Expert Infantryman Badge

be eased so that more candidates can qualify. The board brought tests for the badge up to date so that they now conform to changes in weapons and qualification courses.

Extension Courses

Reserve officers who are planning to bring themselves up to date on changes in courts-martial procedures through extension courses, should know that Common Subcourse 13 "Military Law—The Law of Military Offenses" and Common Subcourse 21 "Military Law—Courts Martial" are being revised to conform to the new manual. They will be ready about 1 July.

The Extension Course Department of The Infantry School reports that the highest number of new enrollees in the history of the Department was recorded during April when new enrollments totaled 924. Added to that were 55 reinstatements. Cancellations numbered 435. Net gain: 544.

MILITARY POLICE

Added Firepower

Efforts to increase the firepower of military police units are underway. Reports on MP combat operations in Korea indicate that traffic patrols and traffic control points are frequently attacked by guerrillas or infiltrators. The lack of automatic weapons has handicapped the MPs in such instances.

The Provost Marshal General has proposed to the Chief of Army Field Forces that miltiary police units in field armies be provided with caliber .30 machine guns with pedestal and ground mounts, and with additional M1 rifles.

New PM Manuals

The Military Police Board has submitted the draft of a new field manual, FM 19-90, "The Provost Marshal," to the Provost Marshal General for final approval and coordination. Publication is expected before the end of the year. The new manual is designed to serve as a guide for provost marshals at all levels, and as a source of information for commanders in their use of provost marshals and military police and for staffs in their relations with provost marshals.

Two related manuals, FM 19-91, "The Combat Zone Provost Marshal," and FM 19-92, "The Communications Zone Provost Marshal," are scheduled for publication in the next year.

Chinese Red Leaders

CHINA'S RED MASTERS. By Robert S. Elegant. Twayne Publishers. 264 Pages; Illustrated; Bibliography; Index; $3.50.

The standard reference books are remarkably silent on the subject of the people who are running China today. This semi-historical, semi-biographical book about the leading Chinese Reds and how they came to power is a very helpful addition to the scanty knowledge of what goes on in China today. Mr. Elegant discusses the personalities and careers of these leading Chinese Communists:

Lin Shao-ch'i, the least known, but, according to Mr. Elegant, the Number Two man in China today.

Chou En-lai, Premier and Foreign Minister, a good executive, but never a policy-maker. Ting Ling, the woman novelist, who epitomizes Red China's embattled "new woman."

The three outstanding soldiers are treated at some length. Chu Teh, the grandfatherly ex-warlord; Lin Piao, considered the prime strategist, and P'eng Te-huai, ruler of Chinese Central Asia; Liu Po-ch'eng who invaded Tibet and now stands poised on the frontiers of Asia, Burma, and Indochina. These men control the multi-million Chinese Army and actually rule the five Administrative Areas into which China proper is divided.

There are others like Kuo Mo-jo, the fiery individualist and lyric poet; Tung Pi-wu, Hsu T'e-li and Lin Tsu-han whose administrative skill has stiffened the Red regime for years. Finally, of course, there is Mao Tse-tung, the master of the Chinese Reds, ruthless in his desire to shape Chinese society to his own pattern.

The plan of the book inevitably makes for considerable duplication and overlapping, and makes the chronology difficult to follow. Despite these faults, however, this is an eminently useful and—as far as this reviewer could determine—highly accurate book.—R.G.McC.

The Army in the Old West

LIEUTENANT EMORY REPORTS. Introduction and Notes by Ross Calvin. University of New Mexico Press. 208 Pages; Notes; Maps; $4.50.

MILITARY LIFE IN DAKOTA: The Journal of Philippe Regis De Trobriand. Translated and edited from the French original by Lucile M. Kane. The Alvord Memorial Commission, 395 Pages; Notes; Illustrated; Index; $7.50.

The increasing interest in early Americana brings a boon to the military student. The move to the West, after all, depended entirely on the good offices of the Army—they explored and surveyed, blazed the trails, built the railroads, manned the forts, and did most of the hard work—getting too little of the credit. The journals of early Army officers provide a wealth of information, and while they are not being published and sold as military books — which they properly are — the military student is being offered a magnificent collection of early military studies.

Lieutenant Emory started out in 1846 to reconnoiter the vast southwest, and report to the War Department on the military, scientific, and economic value of the territory from Bent's Fort in southeastern Colorado westward to the Pacific. In other words, to learn if it was worth General Kearny's time to take his "Army of the West" into that territory and "liberate" it from Mexico. Out of print for over a hundred years, this edition, with notes by Ross Calvin, is very welcome indeed.

The second book, the journal of Colonel Regis de Trobriand, is even more welcome. De Trobriand, a Frenchman who became a Major General of volunteers in the Union Army, was sent in 1867 as a colonel in the Regular Army to command a district in the military department of Dakota. A polished writer, a gifted artist, and an extremely competent officer, he produced a journal which is a delight to read. Booned with an enquiring mind he was interested in everything: Indians, traders, miners, birds, beavers, traffic on the Missouri River, wagon trains, the loneliness of men on military duty. Twelve of his sketches reproduced in this book reveal him as an accurate and sensitive artist.

Both of these books are well worth owning. The publishers and editors deserve great credit for resurrecting them, and reissuing them as handsomely as they have.—R.G.McC.

Mountbatten's Report

REPORT TO THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF BY THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER—SOUTHEAST ASIA 1943-1945. By Vice Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma. British Information Services. 280 Pages; Maps; Appendices; $4.15.

It is to be expected that in an area

where guerrilla tactics predominate, slit throats, stabbed backs, rabbit punches and kidney busters should be common. Unfortunately, this type of tactics was almost as common in the inter-Allied command of Southeast Asia as in the Japanese.

The SEAC command set-up was incredible. Mountbatten, who was Supreme Allied Commander, puts it this way:

"As Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Lieutenant General Stilwell's allegiance was to me; and in my absence from the theater he was directly responsible, through the British Chiefs of Staff, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. As Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander of the China Theater, his allegiance was to the Generalissimo. He therefore had to consider Chinese policy and interests, although these sometimes conflicted with the requirements of Southeast Asia strategy. . . Thirdly, as U.S. Commanding General, C.B.I., Lieutenant General Stilwell was responsible to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff: reporting to, and receiving administrative orders from, the War Department at Washington. As I had operational control of forces in Southeast Asia, and the Generalissimo had operational control of forces in the China theater, when opposite arguments were submitted about the employment of all resources in SEAC, in order to aid China, Lieutenant General Stilwell had either to remain silent or oppose the policy of one or the other of his superiors."

With a situation like this at the top, it is easy to imagine what happened down the line. It is almost impossible to believe that victory could even be hoped for. That it was achieved certainly stands as one of the most remarkable feats of all time.

Mountbatten's account of how it was achieved is a straight-forward one. The command maze he discusses on a professional level; personalities never enter into it. The plan of the report is logical, the exposition is clear; the forty-three maps in color are very useful; the appendices support the facts. It is good to have so clear an account of so clouded and difficult a campaign.—R. G. McC.

RAF Staff Book

THE BRASS HAT. By Group Captain A. H. Stradling (Ret.). Gale & Polden, 1951. 101 Pages; Illustrated; $1.50.

The mission of a staff officer is a little like the Ten Commandments — simple and straightforward in statement, but running to complications in execution.

Briefly, the staff officer exists to assist the commander in the exercise of command; from there, it's every man for himself. This little book, based on staff procedure in the Royal Air Force, can still be a great help to the army officer coming to staff duty, whatever army he serves, for the principles are pretty much the same the world over.

The author has had staff duty with the RAF for many years, obviously knows staff work and staff procedure thoroughly, and writes informally and engagingly. He does not dwell too much on specific methods of paper-shuffling in use in the RAF, preferring to devote himself to advising the young staff officer how to make himself useful not only to his own commander, but to lower commanders with whom he will have to deal.

He also takes up the problem of those who fly, those who do not fly, and those who once flew but are getting a bit old for that sort of thing. In some quarters (not only in the flying services) this is a real problem in human relations, and Group Captain Stradling has some good advice for those staff officers who may be in the two latter groups.

The book is cleverly illustrated, and contains—among other things—a superb definition of a "penguin" (a bird that once flew) with illustration to match.

The Brass Hat is not exactly a new addition to the classic literature of war, but any officer who takes the forty-five minutes or so required to read it will be more than repaid for his time.—O. C. S.

TR's Letters

THE LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Edited by Elting E. Morison. Harvard University Press. Two volumes; 1,478 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $20.00.

These are the first of what is eventually to be an eight-volume set of TR's letters. These two volumes take him through the Spanish-American War in which he served as lieutenant colonel in the Rough Riders. Many of the letters are of interest to a soldier whose reading goes into that period of our history. Teddy was disgruntled because he wasn't awarded the Medal of Honor — and said so many times. Yellow fever and the ineptness of the War Department were greater threats than the enemy, in his estimation. He violated many an Army regulation, and a lesser mortal than a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy and prospective Governor of New York would have been court-martialed. It was a Bully Life while it lasted.—J. B. S.

South American Patriot

SAN MARTIN. By J. C. J. Metford. The Philosophical Library. 154 Pages; Maps; Index; $3.75.

San Martín and Bolivar stand apart as the most eminent of South America's generals—and stand high in the company of any generals—but Bolivar is the only one of the two whose name would be recognized in North America.

José de San Martín, however, was far and away the finer soldier and patriot. Last year, three nations of South America which he liberated from the Spaniards—Argentina, Chile and Peru —commemorated the one hundredth anniversary of his death in poverty and exile. What San Martín did is perceived by all. But what kind of a man he was is obscured by contradictory testimony. Like Gracian's hero he permitted no one to sound the depths of his ability, and he always kept something of his powers in reserve. A thoughtful, unassuming professional soldier, he entered the service of the revolting colonists in the River Plate area when their forces were vainly attempting to penetrate the Bolivian uplands in order to reach the center of royalist power in Peru.

San Martín's professional eye saw the difficulties involved, and he quietly retired to Mendoza in the foothills of the Andes where, despite great opposition and overwhelming difficulties, he created an army from nothing. Awaiting his chance, he led his men across the Andes in six columns. The crossing of the Alps by Napoleon and Hannibal was minor compared to San Martín's venture. Scattering the trained Spanish troops he freed Chile, and then went by sea to Peru. After capturing the viceregal capital of Lima, he felt it beneath him to compete with the flamboyant Bolivar coming down from the north, and he withdrew from the scene.

Mr. Metford's brief book is a model one, and easily the best in English on this great soldier. It should take a rightful place on any shelf of military biographies.—R. G. McC.

Navy Novel

THE CAINE MUTINY. By Herman Wouk. Doubleday & Co. 494 Pages; $3.95.

Despite all of the drum-beating for *From Here to Eternity*, we're still awaiting the great novel of World War II. *The Caine Mutiny* doesn't quite make it either but it is the most entertaining fiction effort so far. It's a humdinger of a story about our World War II navy, savoring much of the *Mr. Roberts* flavor.

Essentially this is the story of Willie Keith, who became a naval officer during the war. His involvement in a "mutiny" aboard the DMS (Destroyer Minesweeper) *USS Caine* provides the second strand in the plot. There is of course a love interest in Willie's life but for once it assumes more natural proportions and doesn't dominate the book. The plot is well-conceived and splendidly carried out, which may come as a surprise to some whose first acquaintance with Mr. Wouk's writing was through *Aurora Dawn*.

The account of the mutiny, the usurpation of command by a junior officer from a senior, is a remarkably good study of military command and discipline. There is a real air of background authenticity throughout the whole book

which can no doubt be credited to the author's service as the executive officer of a DMS during the war.

The Caine Mutiny is as hard to put down as one of C. S. Forester's books. —R. F. C.

Koestler at His Best

THE AGE OF LONGING. By Arthur Koestler. The Macmillan Company. 362 Pages; $3.50.

This novel contains a dozen kinds of Communist talk and some warm love scenes, too. The people in it are of several nationalities and most of the story occurs in Paris.

Already, some reviewers are hailing *The Age of Longing* as one of the best anti-communist novels yet written. (Its author was once in close sympathy with the Communist movement.) And other reviewers have said that Koestler can't get away completely from his old radical notions.

I agree with the first batch. I can't imagine any Communist—Russian, French, English, American, or what not —reading this story without squirming and denying and wishing ill to the author. And I can see large numbers of American readers learning many realistically presented things about Communism in France, and elsewhere, from this book.

There is much enlightenment in it; and maybe some comfort, despite the fact that the time of the book is a few years from now, with the Red forces just about ready to roll over Western Europe. The comfort lies in the remarkable insights we get into the two types of Communist minds—the certain, and the not-so-certain. The cocksure Communist, the non-debater, the man who follows Joe Stalin with a blind faith, such a man will often lack resourcefulness, initiative. The other kind, the man who is sure outwardly but far from positive inwardly—his life is full of fear, or at best, frustration.

Koestler is a superb writer as his earlier books have shown. And here he provides both sex and humor in some quantity, the humor contributing most of the sharpness to his outlines of the Communist mind. And this novel is as good a novel as any he ever wrote.— G. V.

Novel of Communist Infiltration

NEITHER FIVE NOR THREE. By Helen McInnes. Harcourt, Brace & Co. 340 Pages; $3.00.

This fast-moving novel shows the detection of an active Communist cell in the magazine publishing world of New York City. Much of the work leading up to full disclosure is done by amateurs. There is violence, including a murder and a siege. And the principal character, a magazine editor himself, who leads the investigation, finally gets the girl.

The story shows pretty clearly several kinds of people, stupid or bright, and well-meaning or otherwise, who became entangled in the Communist web. It shows the methods of entanglement, especially blackmail. And it shows Communist treachery—not only toward the United States but toward Communists themselves.—G. V.

Baseball

THE OFFICIAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL, Jubilee Edition. By Hy Turkin and S. C. Thompson. A. S. Barnes & Co., 620 Pages; Illustrations; $5.00.

To be perfectly honest, I'm not a baseball fan; haven't been to a game in years. That may be a poor background for a reviewer of a baseball encyclopedia, but I think it's a good one. If I like the book, the fans should love it. It's a humdinger (I'd use a baseball term if I knew one to use). It's got everything any player or fan could want to know:

An all-time record of players and managers, including birth and death data, year-by-year playing record. A history of baseball. A history of the major and minor leagues, and of semi-pro and amateur ball. Rules and scoring. Highlights and scores of every World Series game. Individual league leaders every year in every department. Baseball songs. A complete catalog of all baseball books, magazines, newspapers and films. And plenty more.—R. G. McC.

Best on the Subject

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNISM. By R. N. Carew Hunt. The Macmillan Company. 232 Pages; Notes; Index; $3.00.

As an earlier reader of this volume put it, "Only one who has done some sloshing around in the swampy jungle of this subject . . . can appreciate the neat, clean and reliable road-through that Mr. Hunt has built. He tells you all you need to know. And more remarkable he refrains from telling you endless reams of things you don't need to know. His judgment of values seems equal to his knowledge of facts, which is both vast and accurate."

It is a shame that this English book could not have appeared earlier on the American market. The interested reader has been so deluged by books on, about, around, behind, under and through Communism that he looks with a glassy stare when anyone asks, "Have you read this? This is really *it!*" Unfortunately, this book *really* is it, but a reviewer is going to be hard put to convince anyone.

During the past year I have read at least fifty books on various aspects of Communism. I remember only one with any clarity: the Bolton report (issued by the Infantry Journal Press as *Communism: Its Plans and Tactics*). This small volume, tightly written, and on an adult level will be the second book remembered. It is temperate, well informed and packed with skillfully presented facts.

Believe me when I say that it is the best single, short book on the subject. — R. G. McC.

Books Received

THE SOCIALIST TRAGEDY. By Ivor Thomas. The Macmillan Company. 254 Pages; Index; $2.75.

ONCE AROUND THE SUN. By Brooks Atkinson; Illustrated by Don Freeman. Harcourt, Brace and Company. 376 Pages; $4.00. ". . . the chronicle of a single year in America as lived by one American . . . who spends as much time as he can in his country home."

THE COMMUNIST TRAIL IN AMERICA. By Jacob Spolancky. The Macmillan Company. 227 Pages; Index; $3.50.

RUSSIAN PURGE and the Extraction of Confession. By F. Beck and W. Godin. The Viking Press, Inc. 277 Pages; $3.50.

WHAT'S AHEAD FOR AMERICAN BUSINESS. By Sumner H. Slichter. Little, Brown & Company. 216 Pages; Index; $2.75.

WORDS AND THEIR USE. By Stephen Ullman. Philosophical Library, Inc. 110 Pages; $2.75.

WATCH OUT FOR THE WEATHER. By Jacqueline Berke and Vivian Wilson. The Viking Press, Inc. 226 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $2.95. "Meteorobiology."

PAROLE CHIEF. By David Dressler. The Viking Press, Inc. 310 Pages; $3.50. The experiences of a parole officer.

THE SELECTED POETRY AND PROSE OF SHELLEY. Random House. 524 Pages; $1.25.

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SULEIMAN THE MAGNIFICENT: Sultan of the East. By Harold Lamb. Doubleday & Company, Inc. 370 Pages; Index; $5.00.

TWO SIDES TO A TEACHER'S DESK. By Max S. Marshall. The Macmillan Company. 284 Pages; Index; $3.00. Looking at education from a teacher's and the student's points of view.

NEW WAYS TO BETTER MEETINGS. By Bert and Frances Strauss. The Viking Press, Inc. 177 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $2.95.

THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SCANDAL: A Documented Exposé. By Earl Conrad. The John Day Company, Inc. 270 Pages; Illustrated; $3.50.

SHEEP ROCK. By George R. Stewart. Random House. 286 Pages; $3.00. By the author of *Storm*.

RETURN TO PARADISE. By James A. Michener. Random House. 437 Pages; $3.50. More about the Pacific by the author of *Tales of the South Pacific*.

JUDGMENT ON DELTCHEV. By Eric Ambler. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 247 Pages; $3.00.

THE GOLDED EXILE. By Lawrence Schoonover. The Macmillan Company. 392 Pages; $3.50.

RED STORM OVER ASIA. By Robert Payne. The Macmillan Company. 309 Pages; Index; $5.00. "How to meet the Communist threat in the East."

THANKS TO NOAH. By George and Helen Waite Papashvily; Illustrated by Jack Wilson. Harper & Brothers. 167 Pages; $2.50.

WORLD RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIES, Revised Edition. By Erich W. Zimmermann. Harper & Brothers. 832 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $7.50. A revision of a book which first appeared in 1933.

THE SOVIETS IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1917-1929, in 2 volumes. By Louis Fischer. Princeton University Press. 920 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $10.00. A reissue of a famous book on the Soviet Union.

THE SATURDAY EVENING POST STORIES 1950. Random House. 298 Pages; $3.00.

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POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD 1951. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. 230 Pages; $3.50. The new 1951 edition.

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

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GO FOR BROKE

ON a miserable February day eight years ago, the 442d RCT was activated at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. Its enlisted men and some of its officers were American of Japanese ancestry, who had volunteered for combat.

In case you're wondering what brought this on, MGM has recently made a movie titled "Go For Broke" (the Combat Team motto which means, in the language of the galloping dominoes, "shoot the works"). Since I had served with the 442d for three years and wrote its history, I got in free, which entitles me to one wild, happy fling at movie reviewing.

I have seen three Hollywood films which attempt to show infantry combat in World War II (the other two were "Story of GI Joe" and "Battleground") and "Go For Broke" is the best of the lot, largely, I believe, because most of the leads and a good many of the extras served in the unit and knew from bitter experience what a soldier does and how he feels under fire. Van Johnson, the star, evidently learned enough in "Battleground" to do a creditable job in "Go For Broke," although I can't remember that we ever had a lieutenant quite that green or one who looked as handsome under ten days growth of beard.

"Go For Broke" is not up to the level of "San Pietro" and other magnificent documentaries of World War II as a picture of combat, but no production filmed after the event ever will be. It has, however, certain other things to commend it. It is, first of all, an honest and sympathetic portrayal of the feeling that drove these men to serve, as individuals and as units, with gallantry far beyond simple duty, to earn for their colors and for themselves battle honors and decorations that were the envy of many a veteran regiment. Many of them believed that they were the last hope of their people, that if they fluffed off this chance, they faced return to Japan or, at best, a lifetime as "second class citizens."

THERE was a certain conflict at times between mainland and island soldiers, products of different cultures and different conditions of tolerance. These conflicts and their solution "Go For Broke" shows honestly.

The history of the regiment has been capsuled and shown through the medium of one platoon. Actions performed by units of all battalions are shown through this platoon. Although this necessarily restricts the validity of the film as a picture of infantry in battle generally, I am glad to say that the minor tactics the platoon uses are absolutely valid, and that the terrain on which the film was shot is a remarkable likeness of the ground in Italy and in the Vosges Mountains of France over which the 442d fought.

The men of the 442d are, I understand, honorary citizens of Texas, in gratitude for their dramatic relief of the "lost battalion" of the 36th Division—an action that forms a considerable part of "Go For Broke." I hope that one effect of this production will be to make the men of the 442d honored if not honorary citizens of every state in the Union. They were, and are (many of them are fighting today with units in Korea) among the great soldiers of their country.

OF the organization of the 442d, Franklin D. Roosevelt said: ". . . Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart; Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry." It has remained for the men of whom he spoke to make his words immortal.—O.C.S.

Salomon. Greenberg, Publisher. 205 Pages; Appendixes; $2.95.

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THE NEW PHYSICS. By Sir C. V. Raman. Philosophical Library, Inc. 144 Pages; Index; $3.75.

PEACE CAN BE NOW. By Paul G. Hoffman. Doubleday & Company. 188 Pages; Index; $2.50. By the former Administrator of the E.C.A.

CHINA'S RED MASTERS. By Robert S. Elegant. Twayne Publishers. 264 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.50.

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THE BRASS HAT: A Staff Officers' Guide. By Group Captain A. H. Stradling. Gale & Polden. 101 Pages. Illustrated; $1.50.

GEOGRAPHY OF RUSSIA. By N. T. Mirov. John Wiley & Sons. 362 Pages; Maps; Index; $6.50.

WORLD TENSION: The Psychopathology of International Relations. Edited by George W. Kisker. Prentice-Hall, Inc. 324 Pages; Index; $5.00.

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

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

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

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